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TORT REFORM IN THE
WELFARE STATE: THE NEW ZEALAND
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION A CT
By RICHARD GASKINS*
The state might conceivably make itself a mutual insurance company
against accidents, and distribute the burden of its citizens' mishaps among all
its members. There might be a pension for paralytics, and state aid for those
who suffered in person or estate from tempest or wild beast.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Holmes's suggestion is no longer merely a rhetorical possibility. New
Zealand's Accident Compensation Act 2 (ACA) abolishes common law tort

actions in virtually all personal injury cases.8 It thus eliminates the central
role of judges, juries, and lawyers and by-passes the services of insurance
companies in the settlement of personal injury claims. In place of the common
law, the ACA establishes a state administrative commission to award compensation in accordance with a detailed body of rules and schedules. 4 In
moving to a state-run scheme, the ACA also abolishes the notorious fault

principle; the compensation commission makes no inquiry into the negligence
of anyone connected with the accident.
The New Zealand statute constitutes an important option in the reform
of tort law that is largely absent from recent discussions in the United

@Copyright, 1980, Richard Gaskins.
* Assistant Professor and Director, Law and Social Policy Program, Bryn Mawr
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under Grant No. OSS76-14794. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Science Foundation.
The author wishes to thank his research colleagues, whose views and criticisms have
contributed greatly to this paper: Noel Farley, Jane C. Kronick, John Orbell, Miriam
Vosburgh, and William W. Vosburgh. He is also indebted to Geoffrey Palmer of Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, for reading and commenting on an earlier
draft. Finally, he wishes to thank Sir Own Woodhouse, originator of the New Zealand
scheme, for his generous criticisms and comments. None of the above, however, is to
be held responsible for the opinions expressed in this paper.
I Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1881) at 96.
2 Reprinted as amended [1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409 [hereinafter ACA]. For a brief
summary of the statute as amended through 1973, see Harris, Accident Compensation
in New Zealand (1974), 37 Mod. L. Rev. 361. An administrative law judge, whose
decisions have helped shape the statute, has written a guide for practitioners: see Blair,
Accident Compensation in New Zealand (Wellington: Butterworths, 1978).
3ACA, s. 5. For an analysis of this section and for speculations on which common
law rights may have survived, see Willy, The Accident Compensation Act and Recovery
for Losses Arising from Personal Injury and Death by Accident (1975), 6 N.Z.U.L.
Rev. 250.
4 ACA, s. 6.
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States. 5 There, as in Canada, legislative action has been limited to specific
classes of accidents, notably automobile accidents, and the suspension of common law remedies has been only partial. 6 Meanwhile, academic debate in the
United States has flourished with regard to economic consequences of liability
rules; 7 statutory reform is now seen primarily as facilitating market processes
in defining optimal social outcomes.
In contrast, the New Zealand ACA views tort reform in the context of
welfare state values and legislative policies. Such a view is not satisfied with
piecemeal change for limited classes of accidents, nor does it accept the individualistic, market-oriented terms of the American theorists. The ACA presents both a distinct philosophy of social responsibility and a detailed scheme
to put that philosophy into practice in the field of accident compensation. In
what follows, an attempt is made to articulate the premises of that philosophy
and to criticize the statutory form in which it has been enacted.
In addition to its imaginative solution to the problems of tort law, there
is another reason for close analysis of the New Zealand law. The ACA can
be seen as a new development in modem social legislation, based on an
unusual transposition of common law concepts into a welfare state value
framework. At a time when welfare state policies are moving toward universal
rather than selective eligibility standards, and income-related rather than
means-tested benefits, 8 the ACA recognizes both trends and justifies them by
complex analogy with values recognized under common law. The statute does
far more than create procedural welfare rights; it makes use of legal concepts
in offering a structure and philosophical basis for welfare programs. The
model embodied in the ACA may have implications for legislation well beyond the area of accident compensation."
This paper looks first at the basic principles behind the legislation, in
particular at the distinctive values of "real compensation" and "community
responsibility." It is these principles that make possible the creative adaptation
of traditional common law notions to policies based on a broad view of com-

5 For example, a recent survey of trends in tort reform gives New Zealand only
cursory mention in a chapter on "blind alleys." See O'Connell, Ending Insult to Injury
(Chicago: U. of Illinois Press, 1975) at 73-76.
6
See, e.g., Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1965); O'Connell, The Injury Industry and the Remedy of NoFault Insurance (Chicago: U. of Illinois Press, 1971); O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault
Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals (1973), 59 Va. L. Rev. 749.
7 The major contribution is Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press, 1970).
8
See, e.g., Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976) at
113-37.
9 The first attempt to transplant the New Zealand scheme was the proposal by the
Whitlam government in Australia to extend income-related benefits to victims of accidents, disease and congenital disability; see note 145, infra. In Great Britain, a royal
commission showed considerable interest in the New Zealand scheme, but endorsed
instead more modest changes in the social security system. See U.K., Report of the
Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (Pearson

Report) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1978). See generally Fleming, The
Pearson Report: Its "Strategy" (1974), 42 Mod. L. Rev. 249.
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munity welfare. The critique of the A CA that follows measures the details of
the statute according to its underlying principles, both to see those principles
in action and to identify inconsistencies or conflicts within them. This discussion focusses especially on the major types of loss covered by the statute, on
the categories of injuries excluded from coverage and on the financing of the
scheme. The conclusion raises questions about the inevitable compromises
that occurred in the drafting of the scheme, questions that in no way are
meant to detract from the boldness of the experiment, nor to weaken the
challenge to other countries to search for equally compelling values for guiding the reform of tort law.
II.

UNDERLYING BASES OF THE ACA
The process by which traditional legal concepts have been absorbed and
transformed in the New Zealand law needs some preliminary explanation. In
essence, these concepts are removed from the highly individualistic framework of common law and are reinterpreted within the collectivist social assumptions of welfare state philosophy. Two examples of this process are the
concepts of "real compensation" and "community responsibility," both of
which were key principles in the debate leading to the passage of the ACA. 10
A.

Real Compensation
In tort law, "compensation" means the replacement of a loss that is
deemed capable of objective assessment; compensation as a principle tries as
far as possible to return the victim to the status quo." The New Zealand
statute adopts this important concept: its benefits (called "real compensation") are conceived as replacements of something lost rather than public
charity based on need. 12 How in actual cases should we define the "loss"
that results from personal injury, and is therefore deserving of compensation?
In order to answer this question, the architects of the ACA were forced to
look critically at some highly ambiguous and controversial doctrines of the
common law.
Tort law recognizes several distinct categories of loss, from which the
ACA was forced to make a selection.' 3 These include relatively tangible sums,
such as earnings lost during absence from work and out-of-pocket medical
10 These two concepts originated with the Royal Commission whose report first outlined the legislation. See N.Z., Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand (Woodhouse Report) (Wellington: A. R.
Shearer, Government Printer, 1967) at paras. 5, 56 and 58.
11 See, e.g., Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law (2d ed. London: Weldenfeld & Nicholson, 1975) at 480-81.
12See Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, paras. 61, 297(a) and (b).
13 For a comprehensive discussion of pecuniary and non-pecuniary forms of personal injury-related loss recognized under English law, see Street, Principles of the Law
of Damages (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1962) at 43-73. See also a 1969 parliamentary
white paper supplementing the Woodhouse Report which cited Street's treatise and
generally followed his classification of damages: N.Z., Personal injury-A Commentary
on the Report of the Royal Commission into Compensation for Personal Injury in New
Zealand (Wellington: A. R. Shearer, Government Printer, 1969) para. 39 [hereinafter
White Paper];and Luntz, Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death (Melbourne: Butterworths, 1974).
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expenses. There are also more speculative categories such as the reduction in
future earning capacity caused by permanent disability-a relaxation of the
metaphor of loss, which recognizes that one might "lose" sums that one never
actually had. In addition, courts make awards for non-monetary forms of loss
under such headings as loss of enjoyment of life, bodily disfigurement, and
pain and suffering. Finally, the common law recognizes certain collateral
losses to relatives of the victim, known as wrongful death, loss of services
and loss of consortium.
Obviously, one of the first problems in creating a legislative replacement
for common law compensation is to determine which categories of loss should
constitute the statutory definition of "compensation." The common law provides only the options, not the principles of selection. As we shall see, the
planners of the ACA (partly for political reasons) were gradually led to the
point of accepting virtually the entire list, accompanied by statutory ceilings
on awards for pain and suffering as well as some important administrative
guidelines and schedules to insure uniform treatment.
Further anticipating the analysis below, it should be noted that the ACA
also restricts the scope of "real compensation" by assuming the burden of
personal loss while ignoring property loss. Property loss in New Zealand is
still compensated under traditional tort law and is not preempted in any way
by the ACA. More troublesome for a piece of welfare state legislation that
professes the principle of universal eligibility 14 is the differential treatment of
accidents and illness. The ACA singles out personal loss caused by accidents
and ignores loss caused by illness or other natural disabilities. It seems
obvious that the victims of illness have equal entitlement to benefits on the
basis of need. The proponents of the ACA conceded that this exclusion made
15
little sense and justified it as part of a one-step-at-a-time approach to reform.
However, they must also have sensed that to provide compensation on the
level of common law damages to victims of ordinary illness is to strike out
well beyond the limits of the legalistic concept of compensation on which the
ACA is based. People who get sick ordinarily do not have a cause of action
at law, and it might have created serious conceptual strains to treat them on
the same basis as accident victims under the ACA, for reasons that are
explored below in some detail. 16
Nevertheless, for those losses that are covered, the ACA adopts the common law method of measuring the extent of loss and thus reaches very different results from those flowing from the needs-related standard of benefits
of most welfare legislation. Other aspects of the common law, however, are
significantly changed, in that individual claims are no longer considered within
the particular interpersonal context in which the accident occurred. The loss
from an accident is deemed "compensable" without reference to the fault of
the defendant, or to contributory negligence of the victim, or indeed to any
precise relation to human agency. The notion of compensable loss is freed
14 "Comprehensive Entitlement" is among the basic principles enunciated by the
Woodhouse Commission. See Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, paras. 5 and 57.
15 Id. at para. 17.
16 See text accompanying notes 145-46, infra.
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from the situational context of the common law, in which the existence of a
right to compensation depends on the discovery of an individual with the
corresponding duty to exercise care in the situation.
B.

Community Responsibility
The change in legal concepts imposed by a collective framework becomes
somewhat clearer with the concept of "community responsibility," which
speaks to the question of the duty to make compensation. The common law
roots of this concept are not immediately apparent. One must first look beyond the fault principle, which is a comparatively recent qualification on the
larger doctrine that responsibility to make compensation is based on causal
agency. Before the early nineteenth century, the crucial test of liability in tort
was whether the defendant's behaviour was a cause in fact of injury.' 7 As
the common law developed, the defence was slowly established that the
defendant could escape liability, despite his causal agency, if the accident was
not also his "fault," a doctrine carrying vague connotations of culpability and
that was later elaborated into Holmes's theory of the social duties of the
ordinary prudent man.18 The New Zealand statute, like other modem legislation abrogating the fault principle such as workmen's compensation acts,
returns to the earlier common law theory of responsibility based on
causation. 19
Yet, under the collective philosophy of the ACA, the causal theory of
responsibility undergoes an important change. Whereas in common law the
causal agent must be a distinct individual before there arises the responsibility
to provide compensation, the ACA adopts the premise that society as a whole
is the relevant agent of most accident-producing activities; consequently, the
responsibility to compensate all accident victims falls on the community as
a group.
This unusual assumption can best be understood as a response to the
increasing complexity of social action in modem industrial society. It is a
possible interpretation of events in a world where it is no longer plausible to
isolate discrete causes and effects of human action. Since the Industrial
17 There is extensive literature on the historical development of the negligence
doctrine. See, e.g., Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts (1926),
42 L.Q. Rev. 184. For the view that the fault principle emerged out of an earlier tradition of strict liability, see Holdsworth, 3 A History of English Law (5th ed. London:
Methuen & Co., 1942) at 375-88; Holdsworth, 8 A History of English Law, op. cit. at
446-59 (2d ed.); and Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History (1894), 7
Harv. L. Rev. 441. Other commentators have found evidence that the culpability of the
actor placed limits on civil liability well before the nineteenth century, even though
causation was the dominant element. See Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability
(1926), 42 L.Q. Rev. 37; and Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law (London: Stephens and Sons, 1949) at 184-95. For a balanced discussion of the literature
that concludes that, before the nineteenth century, English courts "looked to causation
rather than fault," see Fleming, Law of Torts (3d ed. Sydney: Law Book Co. of Aust.,
1965) at 8. Fleming's interpretation of this history is cited favourably in the Woodhouse
Report, supra note 10, para. 67.
18 Supranote 1, at 72-129.

19 See Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 173.
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Revolution, individuals have acted increasingly through other individuals
and through the use of machines and other manufactured products. According
to some commentators,20 this growing social and technological complexity,
even in the nineteenth century, posed a decisive challenge to the theory of
responsibility based on causal agency of individuals. Liability would have
expanded rapidly had courts continued to apply the early standard of causein-fact, and the most vulnerable defendants would have been the developers
of industry and technology. Most authorities agree that the fault principle
entered the common law at precisely this moment in order to insulate new
industry from the rigours of an unrestrained causal theory of responsibility.
Henceforth an injured plaintiff was required to prove that the causal agentdefendant owed him a duty of care and had negligently breached that duty.
In Holmes's influential statement of this new doctrine, a further assumption
seemed to be that practically no social duties are owed to anyone 2l-this
despite Holmes's later disparagement of the social theories of Herbert
Spencer. '
The ACA's response to the complexity of modem society can therefore
be seen as a rejection of the rugged individualism of nineteenth century law 23
and as a movement to the opposite extreme in treating social action as irreducibly interrelated. This important premise, combined with the causal
theory of responsibility derived from common law, constitutes the theoretical
foundation of a new concept of "community responsibility."
I
More than any other aspect of the New Zealand law, the principle of
community responsibility suggests that the statute is more than an administrative reform of one troublesome area of tort law. We will speculate on the
further applications of this principle in the analysis below, but it is worth
pointing out here that, even in the limited area of tort reform, the ACA
differs significantly from reforms in other legal systems. It differs, for example,
from doctrines of vicarious or strict liability, which have been the focus of
debate in most common law countries. 24 These doctrines remain tied to the
20 See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 17, at 8; Atiyah, supra note 11, at 37; Ison, The
ForensicLottery (London: Staples Press, 1967) at 3; and Harper and James, 2 The Law
of Torts (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1956) §§ 12.2-.3.
21 Holmes, supra note 1. This interpretation of Holmes rests on reading his dictum
that "loss from accident must lie where it falls" and the surrounding discussion
(Holmes, op. cit. at 94-95) in conjunction with his theory that liability should be recognized only in specific situations (op. cit. at 108-12). My statement in the text was influenced by Gilmore's characterization of Holmes' theory as based on the "proposition
that, ideally, no one should be liable to anyone for anything." See The Death of Contract (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1974) at 16.
22 Lockner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 at 75, 25 S. Ct. 539 at 546 (1905).
23
See Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 67 (citing the analysis of Fleming,
supra note 17, at 108). For an interpretation of the nineteenth century development
of tort law in terms of the growth of individualism, see Harper and James, I Law of
Torts, supra note 20 at xxvii-xxxix.
24 For modern developments in vicarious liability see, e.g., Atiyah, Vicarious Liability (London: Butterworths, 1967); Fleming, supra note 17, at 335-63; and Harper and
James, 2 Law of Torts, supra note 20, §§ 26.1-.15. The artificial manipulation of this
concept in the service of public policy was suggested in a classic article by Douglas,
Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929), 38 Yale L.J. 584.
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administrative structure of courts and call on the courts to "shift" responsibility for certain types of accidents onto particular classes of people in cases
where recovery might otherwise be frustrated. The doctrine of respondeat
superior, for example, makes an employer vicariously responsible to third
parties for the torts of his employees. Under judicial and legislative standards
adopted in most American states, manufacturers are held "strictly" responsible for injuries caused by their defective products, regardless of whether
they were negligent under the fault principle.2 5 By requiring drivers to insure
themselves against most ordinary losses, no-fault automobile insurance limits
the occasions for courts to hear evidence on the often vexatious question of
who was at fault in an accident.2 6
All of these reforms abandon the fault principle to some degree, but they
retain the notion that specific individuals must be held responsible for compensating accident victims. These individuals might not be selected because of
their causal agency but for quite different reasons, such as administrative
simplicity, economic efficiency, or merely because someone must be found
who has money in his pockets. 27 The quest for the viable defendant becomes
increasingly artificial under these approaches, and under the New Zealand
statute that quest is abandoned. The ACA is an implicit rejection of the legal
fictions behind most theories of vicarious or strict liability.2 8 It also suggests
skepticism about the economic allocational virtues of liability rules as advanced by some American theorists.2 9 Under the ACA it is the injury alone
that gives rise to a valid compensation claim, not the fact that the law has
chosen to recognize a suitable defendant.
This leads us back to the related principle of real compensation, which,
as we saw, was patterned closely on the kinds of compensation recognized by
common law. The ACA combines this standard of benefits (more generous
than what social welfare programmes commonly award, and defined with reference to "loss" rather than need) with a new doctrine of social responsibility
which allows recovery to all victims of accidents. This programme clearly
transforms the common law concepts on which it is built. It is also a cautious
first step toward discovering a rationale in law for a new approach to social
welfare legislation based on principles of universal eligibility and earningsrelated benefits.

25 For the development of strict liability for defective products, see Harper and
James, I Law of Torts, supra note 20, §§ 28.1-.33. It should be noted that New Zealand
law did not follow this trend to any major degree. See Franklin, Personal Injury Accidents in New Zealand and the United States (1975), 27 Stan. L. Rev. 653 at 667.
26 For a conceptual survey of reform schemes for auto accidents, see Kalven, A
Schema of Alternatives to the Present Auto Accident Torts System (1968), 1 Conn. L.
Rev. 33.
27
Atiyah, supra note 11, at 98. For an argument that public policy rather than
cause-in-fact should control this process of imputing responsibility through tort law, see
Harper and James, 2 Law of Torts, supra note 20, § 14.1. See also Friedmann, Social
Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability (1949), 63 Harv. L. Rev. 241.
28
See Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 88.
2
9 See text accompanying notes 184-99, infra.
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III. INTERACTION OF COMMON LAW DOCTRINES AND
WELFARE POLICIES
Throughout its long gestation, the ACA was publicly discussed as a step
toward reforming tort law, not as a radical change in the theoretical basis of
welfare legislation. The defects of the tort system as a method for delivering
compensation to accident victims were well-documented in several decades of
scholarship30 and were the subject of discussion in legal circles in New Zealand.3 when the Woodhouse Commission was appointed. 2 There was more
at issue than the performance of the common law; the Commission also
scrutinized the supplementary compensation schemes that were administered
under public law.33 These included the Workers' Compensation Programitself part of an earlier wave of tort law reform that swept most common law
legal systems-and the Social Security Program, which was later the subject
of independent review.3 4 The original mandate of the Woodhouse Commission
was in fact an investigation of workmen's compensation, and it was primarily
Mr. Justice Woodhouse's own initiative that led to the simultaneous critique
of private law and public law compensation schemes.
The Report of the Woodhouse Commission found the tort system inadequate on two distinct standards of performance. First, using an intuitive or
common sense standard of equity and adequacy in meeting the essential needs
of accident victims, the Commission found that the common law was successful in only a small fraction of cases. 35 This criticism was made still sharper
when the Commission applied another standard of adequacy implicit in the
common law itself: the standard of objective loss. By this latter standard, very
few accident victims were able to recover "adequate" compensation. The two
major reasons for this failure were diagnosed as the administrative inefficiencies of civil litigation and the barring of numerous claims because of the
fault principle.
It is equally important to note the Commission's criticisms of workers'
compensation and social security, whose functions were understood to be
filling some of the gaps in the common law system of compensation. While

30 For a review of the literature, see Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. St. Paul: West
Publ. Co., 1971) §84.
31 In New Zealand the discussion began with the release in 1963 of the Report of
the Committee on Absolute Liability (Wellington: A. R. Shearer, Government Printer,
1963). Despite the evidence of failure of the tort system, the majority of the Committee
did not recommend major changes. However, in a spirited minority appendix to the
Report the Solicitor-General, Sir Richard Wild, used the evidence to recommend sweeping legislative changes. This report was cited in the Woodhouse Report, supra note 10,
para. 80 n. 15. See also Wild, Social Progress and Legal Process (1965), 27 N.Z.J.
Pub. Admin. 1.
32 See the charge to the Commission, dated Sept. 14, 1966, reprinted at the beginning of the Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, at 11-13.
33 Id. at parts 4 and 5.
34 See N.Z., Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, Social Security in New
Zealand (Wellington: A. R. Shearer, Government Printer, 1972).
35 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 79.
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generally these schemes were administered more efficiently than the common law, the level of benefits that they provided was also judged inadequate
by both the standard of common sense and the legal standard of objective
loss.

36

This critique suggests that the Woodhouse Commission assumed from
the very start that the common law and welfare policies should be judged by
the same standards of performance, and more particularly that the standards
of one system were relevant for judging the performance of the other. This is
by no means an obvious premise. As Atiyah points out, it is often assumed
that the two systems of compensation have no common ground at all. Prior to

criticizing this assumption, Atiyah attempts to capture some of its rhetoric in
the following passage contrasting torts and social security:
They are utterly different from each other in structure, philosophy and execution.
Torts offer[s] "full compensation," social security a good deal less. Torts pays
compensations for pain and suffering; social security does not-though it does pay
something for some disabilities. Torts compensates in money alone; social security
compensates with a wide variety of welfare benefits as well as with money. Torts
pays lump sum compensation; social security compensation is nearly all made by
periodical payments. Torts depends in practice on liability insurance; social security broadly utilizes a mixture of personal (but compulsory) insurance and
taxation-though the insurance element is becoming somewhat artificial. Tort
claims are mainly administered by the State, but the tort system is vastly more
expensive to operate than the social security systems. Above all, tort claims are
in the main confined to cases in which fault can be proved against someone
covered by
liability insurance; in the social security systems fault is utterly
37
irrelevant.

The Report of the Woodhouse Commission saw beyond these differences in
"structure, philosophy, and execution." It not only initiated the proposal to
combine some of the administrative features of both systems; it also laid the
basis for a deeper conceptual synthesis in its critique, by the simple method
of evaluating the performance of one system in terms of the ideals of the
other.
As mentioned above, there was already ample literature criticizing the
tort system for failing to deliver compensation to large numbers of accident
victims. 38 This line of criticism depends on identifying something more than
strictly "legal" errors in adjudication. As far as common law procedure is
concerned, the lack of reversible error in a case is consistent with justice, as
is the dismissal of a claim for failure to state a cause of action, or the defeat of
a claim for failure of the plaintiff to carry the burden of proof. A claim settled
out of court is likewise acceptable to the law, as is the often erratic behaviour
of juries that set damages awards, but the justice that results from seeing each
case simply on its own legal merits is not the same as justice conceived in a
social and collective environment. The fact that some victims are compensated
while others are not--even though all the rules of the legal system are fol-

30 Id.,
37

para. 39.
Supra note 1], at 14-15.

38 Supra note 3 1.
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lowed-violates the basic norms of a welfare state philosophy, especially
when it is the cases of extreme need that tend to be least successful. The
Woodhouse Commission was not original in this critique; it joined a large
chorus of critics. 39
On the other hand, the Commission did provide a novel critique of the
various public programmes designed to supplement the common law by providing accident compensation. It would have been possible merely to say that
these programmes failed to provide "enough" compensation; but this is a
slippery standard to apply, even when it is clear in the most glaring cases of
need that more should be done. Philosophies of welfare cannot clearly articulate what "enough" means and whether it is limited to a social minimum or
should be set at some more generous level. 40 The use of a means test 41 under
the New Zealand social security scheme implied that need was the reference
point for judging adequacy. Given financial restraints, that point was not
likely to be set very high.
However, the common law offers a convenient standard for passing
judgment on the level of benefits: the accident victim should not only be permitted to subsist, but should be restored as closely as possible to his position
prior to injury. That society's obligation to compensate should be measured
by this standard is a new approach to welfare policy. The benefits are high,
but the amount is defined by the objective standard of measuring the "loss."
Mr. Justice Woodhouse concluded, in effect, that compensation at any lower
standard is an avoidance by the community of its real responsibilities.
We can now summarize the point of view that finds a positive interaction
between welfare policy and the common law. On the one hand, the tort
system must be newly conceived to conform with social interests, collective
action, and public administration-in order to avoid the anachronism of the
common law's individualistic analysis of action and the anomalies of case-bycase adjudication. 42 On the other hand, welfare policy must be reconstructed
on a new basis of objectivity in setting levels and categories of benefits.
In many countries, public programmes are increasingly caught between
the demand for social services and the political restraints created by the inability of reformers to legitimize broad collective action. The common law
may be able to provide legitimacy for a greatly increased level of benefits,

39 The Commission independently reached conclusions strikingly similar to those
found in Ison, The Forensic Lottery, supra note 20, which the Commission read in
manuscript and cited favourably in the Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 97.
40 See, e.g., Titmuss, supra note 8, at 182-85.
41 In 1967, benefits under the social security scheme were available only to those
accident victims whose incomes fell below a prescribed level. Those who met this means
test based on income received only the basic flat-rate benefit, rather than compensation
related to the amount of loss. See the Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, paras. 241-74.
42 Titmuss argues for a shift from an individual to a social understanding of causation as one approach to justifying universal rather than selective distribution of benefits:
see supra note 8, at 133.
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since in many societies the appeal for "rights" has greater force than the
appeal for needs. 43 At least, this is the position that the Woodhouse Report
seems to represent. Whether it is a coherent philosophy capable of wider
extension remains to be investigated. In the analysis below, we will explore
the content of the ACA, which evolved out of long debate over the specific
recommendations of the Woodhouse Commission. In doing so we shall try to
identify the strengths and weaknesses of this new philosophy which is put to
the test in a very complex scheme, and which is subject to financial and
political pressures as well as to conflicting philosophical views.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE ACA
While the central values of the ACA suggest a new approach to social
legislation, the Act itself shows certain internal conflicts that may be an
inescapable part of that approach. When it comes to setting precise boundaries
to eligibility (for example, in defining "injury by accident"), to defining the
limits of "real compensation," or to allocating the costs of the scheme, the combination of legal and welfare approaches shows itself to be, at best, an uneasy
compromise. Much of the tension can be understood against the background
of the law's evolution over a period of six years, from the time of the Woodhouse Report in 1967 to the important amendments of 1973. 44 Political
pressures and special interest groups exploited these tensions, making the final
legislation anything but a perfect model for future extension.
The discussion below will focus on three specific themes in the ACA:
(A) categories of "compensable loss," (B) exclusions from coverage and
(C) distribution of costs. In each case we shall try to follow the debates that
took place during the long period in which the ACA reached its finished form.
We shall also examine the trade-offs that occurred at each crucial stage in the
process. The final legislation is full of compromises that can be understood
only in light of this complex legislative history. The main documents we shall
consider are the following: the statute itself as amended through 1978; 4t the

43 For a somewhat polemical statement of this point, see Scheingold, The Politics
of Rights (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1974) at 50:
The language of the law in political discourse is largely metaphorical. No one
can realistically expect public debate to sort effectively through the claims and
counterclaims over what is, in fact, the applicable rule. Instead, legal symbols are
used to persuade those involved in the conflict that it makes sense to think of the
problem at hand in terms of rights and obligations-thus tapping the latent
sensitivity to the need for rules and, at the same time, framing the issue in readily
comprehensible fashion.
44
These amendments are discussed in the text accompanying notes 122-27, infra.
45For the text of the A CA as amended, see supra note 2. The original Act and
subsequent amendments are as follows: Accident Compensation Act, [1972] 1 N.Z.
Stat. 521, No. 43; Accident Compensation Amendment Act. [1973] 1 NZ. Stat. 825,
No. 112; Accident Compensation Amendment Act (No. 2), [1973] 1 N.Z. Stat. 829, No.
113; Accident Compensation Amendment Act, [1974] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1622, No. 71; Accident Compensation Amendment Act, [1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1220, No. 136; Accident Com-

pensation Amendment Act, [1977] 3 N.Z. Stat. 2709, No. 138; and Accident Compensation Amendment Act, [1978] 1 N.Z. Stat. 296, No. 36.
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Woodhouse Commission Report of 1967 ;4" an ensuing White Paper (1969),47
which elaborated on the Woodhouse Commission's recommendations; and the
final report of a legislative body, the Gair Committee (1970) ,48 which preceded the final drafting of the statute in 1972.49
A.

Categoriesof CompensableLoss: The Contours of "Real Compensation"

Despite important differences between the two major reports on the
ACA prior to its drafting-the reports of the Woodhouse Commission and
the Gair Committee-there is at least one point of major agreement: benefits
under the ACA are conceived as compensation rather than welfare. 50 Yet the
term "compensation" can be highly ambiguous, as evidenced by the very different specific recommendations in each report as to the kinds of loss deemed
"compensable."
The following headings of loss are now recognized by the ACA and will
be discussed in turn:
51
1. lost earnings during a period of temporary incapacity;
52
disability;
permanent
2. lost future earnings53caused by
3. non-economic loss.
The first category, which is the most easily measured kind of loss, was endorsed in principle by both reports. The reports differed only on the method
of calculating lost future earnings and on the still more speculative process
of measuring non-economic losses.

46 Supra note 10. Geoffrey Palmer, a close associate of Mr. Justice Woodhouse
during the debate over the ACA and a leading authority on the politics of the ACA,
has documented the political context of the Woodhouse Report in a series of articles:
Palmer, Abolishing the Personal Injury Tort System: The New Zealand Experience
(1971), 9 Alta. L. Rev. 169; Palmer and Lemons, Towards the Disappearanceof Tort
Law-New Zealand's New Compensation Plan, 1972] U. Illinois L.F. 693; Palmer,
Compensation for Personal Injury: A Requiem for the Common Law in New Zealand
(1973), 21 Am. J. Comp. L. 1. See also his forthcoming book, Compensation for
Incapacity (as yet unpublished, 1980).
47 Supra note 13. For a brief review of the White Paper, see Szakats, Reform of
Personal Injury Compensation (1970), 4 N.Z.U.L. Rev. 139.
48 N.Z., Report of the Select Committee on Compensation for Personal Injury in
New Zealand (Gair Report) (Wellington: A. R. Shearer, Government Printer, 1970).
For a sympathetic review, see McKenzie, Report of the Select Committee on Compensation in New Zealand (1971), 34 Mod. L. Rev. 542.
49 The drafting was done by the McLauchlin Committee, whose precise role is
difficult to document. For a discussion of the work of the committee, see Orbell, supra
note 45; and Palmer and Lemons, supra note 46, at 724.
G0"In the present context the principle must be compensation for losses, not assistance for need. .. ." See the Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 260. See also the
Gair Report, supra note 48, para. 5.
51
ACA, ss. 112-13.
521d., ss. 114, 116 and 118.
53 Id., ss. 119-20. The Act also authorizes payments for medical expenses (ss. 10711), but these provisions will not be discussed in the text. For an overview of these
headings for compensation and their relation to common law categories, see Willy,
supra note 3.
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1. Lost Earnings During a Period of Temporary Incapacity
The ACA currently compensates accident victims for lost earnings during
a temporary period of absence from work. Benefits are awarded by the Accident Compensation Commission (ACC) at the rate of eighty percent of
actual earnings, 54 except that during the first week of incapacity a worker
may request directly from his employer compensation at the rate of one
hundred percent. 55 There is thus no period of incapacity excluded from coverage, no minimum or maximum period of eligibility.
Both the Woodhouse and Gair reports acknowledged that the eighty percent factor represents a reduction of benefits compared to what a successful
plaintiff could receive under tort law.56 They justify the figure in terms of the
general social goal of giving injured workers an incentive to return to work
as soon as possible, passing quickly over the obvious fact that this is already
a serious compromise with the goal of full compensation based on the
objective loss principle. The Gair Committee answered trade union criticisms
of this limit by predicting that workers as a group would still come out ahead
under the scheme, even though the occasional worker might have achieved
greater benefits under the common law.57 Apparently the much decried "lottery" aspect of the negligence system still had some appeal to the working
man.

The provisions on lost earnings are taken from the Gair Committee
Report.58 The Woodhouse Commission had recommended a radically different
scheme, excluding from full coverage all "short-term" injuries, defined as
injuries causing up to four weeks' incapacity., 9 The Commission urged the
concentration of benefits where "need" was greatest and expressed special
concern for the victims of serious injury under existing compensation programmes. 60 Making no effort to reconcile this naked distributive choice with
the overall legalistic posture of the legislation, the Commission recommended
nominal payments (up to twenty-five dollars per week) for the first four
weeks of lost earnings. 1 This amount was roughly equal to the current
weekly maximum under the Workers' Compensation Act, 62 which the Commission elsewhere criticized for being too low0 3 and for following the "social
assistance principle that need'64should be the test for assistance rather than loss
the measure of recompense.
54

ACA, s. 113.

55

6 d., s. 112.
5 See the Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, paras. 292(a) and (b); and the
Gair Report, supra note 48, para. 106.
57 Gair Report, id., para. 12. Cf. Palmer and Lemons, supra note 46, at 731.
58 Gair Report, id., Recommendations 19 and 21.
59 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, paras. 301(a)-(e).
60 Id., paras. 224 and 257.
61 Id., para. 301 (d).

62 (1956), 16 Repr. Stat. N.Z. 799. The statistics come from the Woodhouse Report, id., Appendix 8.
63 Id., para. 225.
64 Id., para. 227.
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According to statistics in the 1969 White Paper, short-term temporary
incapacity claims would have comprised 86.3 percent of all industrial injuries. 5 Assuming a similar percentage of short-term injuries for accidents
outside of industry, it appears that the Woodhouse Commission was in fact
prepared to abandon wage-related benefits for the substantial majority of
accident cases. At the same time, common law remedies for all injury victims
were to be abolished. 66
The Gair Committee recognized that this was a major departure from the
objective loss principle. In responding to pressures mentioned above, it
draped itself in the legalistic standard of full compensation and eliminated
the Woodhouse Commission's four-week exclusion, even increasing the first
week's benefits to the full amount of the loss. The Committee expressed
sympathy for the needs of long-term victims but saw no reason why the worker67
injured for only the short term should "sacrifice" his benefits for their sake.
The full compensation principle thus provided a simple excuse for enlarging
benefits in response to trade union demands while avoiding the appearance
of a value choice. Note, however, that the Gair Committee too was willing
to compromise with the full compensation standard in advocating an eighty
percent rate of compensation after the first week.
In a different area, the Gair Committee was possibly overzealous in
invoking the common law full compensation standard. The Woodhouse
Report had proposed benefits for injured non-workers-both a nominal
weekly benefit and compensation for non-economic loss. 68 To this the Gair
Committee responded with simple logic: where there are no earnings, there
can be no lost earnings. The purpose of the ACA was compensation for loss,
not social assistance. 69 On this analysis, the Committee recommended the
complete exclusion of non-workers from coverage, 70 and this suggestion was
followed in the Act as originally passed in 1972. However, in 1973 (before
the law took effect in 1974) Parliament amended the ACA to allow compensation to non-workers for losses other than past or future earnings. 71 In
retrospect, it seems that the Gair Committee was prepared to "sacrifice" certain benefits of non-workers in order to save costs, in its own departure from
the legal standard of full compensation.
While the Gair Committee thus used the objective standard of loss in
selective ways in response to interest group pressure and financial constraints,
65 White Paper, supra note 13, para. 6.
66 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 280(b).

Gair Report, supra note 48, para. 24.
08 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, paras. 292(e), 300(a)-(c) and 304(e).
69 See the Gair Report, supra note 48, para. 34.
70 Id., para. 35. This paragraph cites the uncertainty of costs as one reason for the
exclusion of non-workers. However, this problem alone does not justify the exclusion
of all benefits to non-workers without the implicit premise that their needs in general
are the responsibility of social security. It should be noted that the Gair Report recommended inclusion of non-workers in the Motor Vehicle Accident Scheme, although they
were to receive no income-maintenance payments. Op. cit., Recommendations No. 23-24.
71 Accident Compensation Amendment Act (No. 2), [1973] 1 N.Z. Stat. 829, No.
113,s. 37.
67
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the Woodhouse Commission was selective in a very different sense. The Commission appealed to the common law standard in order to criticize low benefits
under workers' compensation and social security programmes, but it was also
willing to compromise, as we saw, in serving the needs of the long-term
disabled. The Report contains frequent appeals to the objective loss principle:
"Real compensation demands that income-related benefits should be paid for
the whole period of incapacity. ' 72 However, we have also listed the departures
from this principle recommended by the Commission: an eighty percent rate
of compensation for lost earnings, exclusion of claims for short-term injuries,
and fiat-rate benefits for non-workers.
It seems clear that any public programme of this sort will be sensitive to
costs and that financial limitations may ultimately be responsible for compelling the adherents of "full compensation" to reach certain compromises.
This is illustrated in another recommendation of the Woodhouse Commission
regarding a ceiling on weekly awards related to lost earnings. The Commission
proposed a limit of $120 per week, rejecting an earlier proposal of $80. It
justified the higher figure by the logic of objective loss: under the higher
figure, more people would receive "full compensation." 78 No resort to criteria
of need was made in this case, unlike the Commission's method of justifying
more favourable treatment for long-term over short-term injuries. The Commission also noted, however, that the additional cost of the $120 ceiling was
slight, tacitly acknowledging that a distributive choice might have been necessary here if major resources hung in the balance.'74 We can see this interesting
blend of full compensation rhetoric and appeals to cost limitations in the
following statement on the whole issue of whether earnings-related benefits
are "equitable":
A final issue was put on the basis of equity. We were asked to consider whether
the community should "maintain a person at his pre-accident income if the
income was well above what an average person would receive in full-time employment." Our answer is that if such a person should become the chance victim of
socially acceptable activity it would be wrong to leave him to make drastic adjustments in his standard of living merely to pay lip service to egalitarian doctrines
unneeded by any economic consideration. The community should accept responsibility for all victims of accident: and if that responsibility is to be fairly discharged every man should be provided with a fair measure of his actual losses.
The calculations as to cost contained in the appendices to this Report make it
clear that this can be done for all citizens without affecting the claims of any.
Real compensation is the aim, and in our view injustice by discrimination must
be avoided.75
There are many occasions on which the Woodhouse Commission acknowledged that, while "real compensation is the aim," considerations of cost
could make the universal extension of such benefits impossible. 70 The Commission was frank in stating its value preferences where substantial savings

72 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 55.
73 Id., para. 300(e).
74 Id., para. 440.
75 ld., para. 267.
76

Id., paras. 434-35.
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were possible: it wished to concentrate resources where need was greatest,
namely, on victims of serious accidents. 77 The Gair Committee drew back
from formulating its distributive goals and instead used the language of
objective loss to support its selective modifications of the Woodhouse Commission's proposals. The statute itself masks these distributive choices still
more completely by simply using common law language to support its notion
of "compensable loss," as though the common law possessed clear answers
to hard questions of social choice.
2.

Lost Future Earnings Caused By Permanent Disability
For further evidence that the common law can be an uncertain guide,
we may turn to a relatively speculative category of "loss" recognized by
courts and represented in the ACA: lost future income for the permanently
disabled victim.
For speculative losses generally, the common law theory of objective loss
becomes highly artificial. 78 A state-administered scheme, however, has an
opportunity to minimize certain inequities in the civil judicial process by
devising in advance detailed compensation schedules for such forms of loss.
The goals of the ACA clearly include eliminating the "lottery" features of the
common law and emphasizing swift and responsible settlement of claims. 79
However, the ACA still justifies preempting this area on the legal theory of
objective loss; wherever losses occur, even speculative losses, the state should
cover them if compensation is to be "real" or "full. 80 Nevertheless, since
there is no easy way to measure the amount of loss in these instances, the
state has a great deal of leeway within the common law conceptual framework
for standardizing benefits, for setting limits on recovery for pain and suffering,
and for streamlining administration.
Lost future income is still economic loss, even though its precise measurement is difficult. None of the background debate on the ACA questioned
the propriety of compensation under this heading, even though one might
argue that accident victims are not the only ones who lose opportunities for
future income, and thus should not be singled out for special treatment.8 ' The
only controversy was how to calculate the amount of compensable loss. On
this matter, interestingly, the proponents of the ACA were critical of the common law practice of awarding lump sum damages, 82 although eventually the
statute called for a combination of periodic payments and lump sums for
compensating speculative losses as a whole.
Under the current statute, the formula for assessing lost future earnings
is complex.83 First, the past weekly earnings of a worker during a base period
77
78

Id., para. 226.

See, e.g., Atiyah, supra note 11, at 187-96; and Ogus, Damages for Lost Amenities (1972), 35 Mod. L. Rev. 1.
79 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, paras. 94 and 278(a).
80 See id., para. 291 (c).
81
See Atiyah, supra note 11, at 484.
82 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, paras. 115-22.
83 ACA, s. 114(1).
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are determined. These earnings are then multiplied by point eight (the discount applied also to past earnings) and by another factor that represents
"the percentage which that permanent loss ... bears to permanent loss of his
capacity to earn." 84 This last factor raises an important question of equity.
The loss of a finger may have a greater impact on future earnings for a
secretary than for a corporate executive. Nonetheless, uniform percentages
may be applied in cases of similar permanent disabilities, regardless of the
specific job that the accident victim was best suited to perform.
The main conceptual puzzle, however, is that the ACA, in its attempt to
find a formula for calculating lost future earnings for the permanently disabled, relies on two factors that have no simple relation to future earnings:
past earnings and the degree of incapacity. Even the discretion allowed the
ACC to adjust such awards (which up to now the ACC has used very sparingly) would not be sufficient to rule out unfairness. We may concede that,
where disability is total, the inequities of this formula may be minimal; but
for only partial permanent disability, our example of the secretary and the
corporate executive illustrates the possible impact.
The proponents of the A CA struggled with this problem. Here the common law practice was of little help, since no simple formulae have been
established by the courts. At least the ACA promised a degree of uniformity
in basing awards on two specific factors, suggesting certainty if not equity.
None of the alternative approaches suggested by the two commissions made
conceptual sense in terms of the professed goal to compensate for "real"
losses. Instead, ease of administration and the desire to keep benefits at least
as generous as under the common law have forced a compromise with the
objective loss principle.
The Woodhouse Commission authored the current formula; 5 however,
their approach drew criticism from the Gair Committee. Once again flying
the flag of "objective loss," the Committee wanted the ACC to estimate future
earnings in each individual case at the time a claim was processed. 80 This is
in fact what the ACA in its original adopted form required. 87 Nonetheless,
the law was amended in 197588 to return to the simpler but conceptually confused Woodhouse approach. The ACC experienced real difficulty estimating
future earnings losses, and, based on this experience, Palmer concluded that,
under the original law, "many people permanently incapacitated would have
had considerable difficulty securing anything." 89 The restored Woodhouse
formula, which determines lost future earnings with reference to past earnings
and the degree of permanent incapacity, was clearly easier to administer and

84
85

Id., s. 114(1) (c).
Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, paras. 291 and 303.

86 Gair Report, supra note 48, para. 80.

87Accident Compensation Act, [1972] 1 N.Z. Stat. 521, No. 43.
88Accident Compensation Act, [1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1220, No. 136.
89 Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: The First Two Years (unpub-

lished paper presented to the Australian Universities Law Schools Ass'n Conference,
August 1976) at 28.
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yielded more generous benefits to claimants. In the absence of any clearer
way to determine the "real loss" in this kind of situation, the values of simplicity and generosity prevailed. 90
3.

Non-Economic Loss
Even though the whole notion of real compensation is modeled on common law terms, we saw that there is no escape from distributive and administrative choices in applying this notion to an essentially speculative loss. The
common law certainly provides no foolproof formula. The leeway for policy
choice is still greater where the speculative loss is non-economic. For example, despite its reliance on the common law theory of objective loss, the
Woodhouse Report made no reference to pain and suffering as a possible
basis for compensation. 9
The ACA currently recognizes as compensable two forms of noneconomic loss: "non-economic loss related to permanent loss or impairment
of bodily function"9 2 and a residual category encompassing loss of amenities
or "capacity to enjoy life" and "pain and suffering, including nervous shock
and neurosis."0 3 Both awards are made in lump sums with upper limits prescribed by the Act ($7,000 for impairment of function, $10,000 for pain and
suffering), whereas the other payments for economic loss discussed above are
periodic. The award for impairment of function is calculated by multiplying
$7,000 by a fraction representing a percentage loss of total bodily function, as
specified in an elaborate schedule.9 4 For example, the loss of an arm represents an eighty percent disability, loss of a thumb twenty-eight percent, and
so on. The calculation of pain and suffering awards is not made by reference
to degrees of disability or schedules of any kind, but rather is established
in each case "as the Commission thinks fit." 95 Here is the wild card in the
whole New Zealand scheme-the "lottery" element of the common law system
that the drafters were unable to resist.
Precisely where these categories came from and why they are in the law
is somewhat mysterious. English law recognizes all three categories but provides no precise definitions or guidelines for calculation.96 It seems too simple
to assume that these categories deserve recognition in a law of this sort simply
because common law judges have admitted them at one time or another. The
evidence shows that there was great uncertainty over what to include in this
portion of the law. It does appear that there was pressure from trade unions

90 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 200.

91 See White Paper, supra note 13, para. 123. The suggestion in this paragraph
opened the way for the recognition by the Gair Committee of a separate category of
compensation for non-economic loss. See the Gair Report, supra note 48, Recommendation No. 22.
92 ACA, S.119.
93

Id., s. 120.

94 Id.,
95

s. 119(2) and the second schedule.
1d.,s. 120(1).
90 See, e.g., Street, supra note 13, at 43-73; and Luntz, supra note 13.
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to adopt the "loss of bodily function" provision, and pressure from the legal
profession to include pain and suffering.
Some of the evidence of interest group pressure is indirect. The Woodhouse Commission first took the approach of recognizing no separate category
of non-economic loss. Recall that the Commission's formula for calculating
future earnings losses caused by permanent incapacity included a factor based
on the extent of physical incapacity (which was then refracted through the
amount of prior earnings). These awards were intended not only to compensate for lost future income but were graded to benefit more generously
the most serious injuries. The Woodhouse formula begins to make some sense
in this light. If the corporate executive receives the same proportion of his
past income as the secretary, both of whom have lost a finger, this is not
purely designed to cover the future economic losses of both; it was also meant
to recognize an independent, non-pecuniary loss, stemming from the "loss of
physical capacity itself."197 As a result, the Commission recommended no
separate categories of non-pecuniary compensation, but expressed the hope
that the ACC would use liberal discretion in setting awards for future earnings
08
losses so as to deal fairly with the "unusual case." 9
The Woodhouse approach to this whole area of speculative losses thus
had great administrative simplicity, but it appeared to ignore some of the
traditional categories of common law damages. When the Gair Committee
surveyed this area, it introduced major changes. First it dropped the Woodhouse formula for calculating future earnings losses in favor of a more realistic
estimation on a case-by-case basis.99 Furthermore, the Gair Committee recommended lump sum compensation "principally for loss of enjoyment of
life from loss of bodily function."''1 In addition to restoring much of the
common law appearance to compensation under the ACA, this combination
of provisions also made consistent sense. Since future earnings losses were no
longer to be measured by the extent of permanent physical incapacity, it
seemed proper to recognize this traditional form of non-pecuniary loss in a
separate way.
This approach was also a response to pressure from trade unions to
include a lump sum provision somewhere in the Act-to retain some element
of the old, much-maligned "lottery" of the common law. By creating an additional category of compensation, the Gair Committee strengthened its
argument that the complete compensation package under the ACA would
leave workers as a group no worse off than they were under common law. 101
Once again, the Gair Committee was able to justify its revision of the Woodhouse plan by reference to the hallowed categories of common law: noneconomic loss was "real" and deserved separate recognition because the common law said so. At the same time, the Committee was not disposed to follow

97 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 291(d).
98 Id., para. 303 (e).
99 Gair Report, supra note 48, paras. 80-81.
100 Id., Recommendation No. 22.

I01 Gair Report, supra note 48, para. 12.
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common law practices slavishly when it came to the extravagant benefits
sometimes awarded by juries. It set a maximum on awards of $10,000, with
partial payments to be calculated according to a schedule of medical injuries
similar to what the Woodhouse Commission had recommended as part of its
plan to compensate future earnings losses. 10 2
While the two background reports suggested alternative coherent models,
these two methods for compensating speculative losses became confused in
the original text of the ACA. The Gair Committee's recommendations were
followed for future earnings and for a separate category of non-economic loss
(although the former provision was replaced, as we saw, in 1975). 103 However, the name of this separate category was changed: instead of compensation
for loss of enjoyment of life, as the Gair Committee intended, this section
simply recognized "non-economic loss related to permanent loss or impairment of bodily function."' 4 In addition, a new category of compensation
was created to cover both "loss of enjoyment of life" and "pain and suffering."
This last category was not limited to cases of permanent disability and was
tied to no schedule. The awards were to be entirely discretionary up to a
maximum of $10,000.105
Ironically, with the return in 1975 to the Woodhouse Commission's
formula for calculating future earnings losses, the ACA diverged even farther
from the original Woodhouse approach to the whole field of speculative losses
caused by permanent incapacity. The Commission had envisaged a periodic
payment that would reflect both future earnings losses and the extent of
physical impairment. The Act now contains this provision, but it also contains
the additional sections just described: a lump sum payment for "noneconomic loss related to permanent loss or impairment of bodily function,"
and a lump sum payment for further psychic loss, "loss of capacity for enjoying life" and "pain and suffering." The former lump sum award is determined
by a schedule of disabilities applied to a statutory maximum of $7,000. The
latter lump sum knows few bounds: it is limited to $10,000, but may be
awarded at the discretion of the ACC in any case of injury by accident
covered by the ACA.
At the drafting stage, it must have been difficult to argue against the
pain and suffering provision. This is, after all, a doctrine known to common
law, which was sufficient justification to the Gair Committee to recognize
other categories of compensation as self-evident. One can also detect the
special interests of the legal profession behind this provision. Geoffrey Palmer
confirms that it was included at the urging of negligence lawyers, who saw an
opportunity to keep their skills sharp. Palmer reports that this is one of the
most heavily contested provisions of the law. Each case requires review by the
ACC on its individual merits; applications for review of ACC awards in this

102

Id., Recommendation No. 22 and para. 111.

See notes 87 and 88, supra.
92.
105 ACA, s. 120.
103
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area are high, "and lawyers seem to be involved in these claims much more
frequently than they have been with other sections of the Act."1 00
All that one can conclude is that the ACA is now impossibly muddled.
There is no coherent theory of what "real compensation" should mean in the
area of speculative loss. The phrase is invoked simply to lend an impression
of objectivity to a package of benefits inspired by a mixture of public welfare
goals and special interests. The current posture of the law is more confused
than either the Woodhouse or Gair recommendations. It is a hybrid of these
inconsistent theories plus a third approach (the pain and suffering provision),
whose only apparent function is to sweeten the pot.
B.

Exclusions from Coverage: The Limits of "Community Responsibility"
Having surveyed the kinds of loss which the ACA deems compensable,
consideration must now be given to a second major set of qualifications contained in the law. The concept of community responsibility is given great
importance in all the background discussions of the ACA. 10 7 Once a loss has
been incurred, the social duty to compensate is understood to follow. As the
Woodhouse Commission stated: "Few would attempt to argue that injured
workers should be treated by society in different ways depending upon the
cause of injury."''0 8 If this is so, why is the community's responsibility to
compensate limited only to losses caused by accidentalinjury? Income is lost
just as much by a worker who is unable to work because of an illness completely unrelated to accidental injury. If the cause of accidental injury is
irrelevant to society's duty to compensate, 0 9 should the ACA not go farther
and say that the cause of the loss is also irrelevant?
The most significant exclusion from coverage under the ACA is this
exclusion of losses caused by circumstances other than "accidents." No feature
of the ACA raises more questions than this central limitation. It is fair to say
that all the background reports were aware of this anomaly. For example, the
Woodhouse Commission acknowledged that the "logic" of the accident compensation scheme would require similar treatment of losses caused by illness.
"But logic on this occasion must give way to other considerations.""u 0 These
included the prudence of proceeding step-by-step in introducing far-reaching
social legislation, the problems of coordinating existing health programmes
and the lack of statistical resources for planning a national sickn.ss compensation scheme. Of course, cost and financing are further factors left unmentioned by the Woodhouse Report. By exploring some of these reasons
for limiting "real compensation" to accidental injuries, we may learn more
about the considerations that were strong enough to frustrate the "logic" of
the compensation ideal.
106 Palmer, supra note 89, at 26. Palmer has reviewed the Commission's internal
decisions involving sections 119 and 120: see Lump Sum Payments Under Accident
Compensation, [1976] N.Z.L.J. 368.
107 See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 13, paras. 91 and 92.
108 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 6.
109 Id.
0
11
Id., para. 17.
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Other broad exclusions are property loss, economic loss in the nature of
contract damages and injuries to personal privacy and reputation. While
"illness" as such has never been the basis of a cause of action under the common law, these other forms of loss are often deemed compensable in civil
actions. Does the "logic" of the accident scheme apply to them as well? There
is no discussion of these issues in the background reports or in the legislation
itself, but we will want to return to this question.
Exclusion of Certain Accidental Injuries
We should look at several specialized exclusions contained in the ACA
which may give us important clues as to the nature of the values in conflict
with the principle of compensation. Among these exclusions are benefits for
12
non-workers (until the ACA was amended in 19731"), for the elderly,.11
and for victims of deliberately self-inflicted injuries, including suicide.
injured while carrying out a crime are apparently eligible for benePersons
fits,"14 but dependents cannot recover their survivors' benefits if they have
been convicted of murder or manslaughter of the decedent."1 5
1.

The omission of non-workers in the law as originally passed is a striking
example of the selective approach to the principles of universal eligibility and
community responsibility. The Act was divided into two distinct programmes
to be financed separately: an Earners' Scheme" 0 and a Motor Vehicle Accident Scheme." 7 The former covered all employed workers, whether or not
their accidents were work-related in the sense required under most workmen's
compensation programmes."" The Motor Vehicle Accident Scheme applied to
workers and non-workers alike and covered all injuries incurred in motor
accidents." 19 Left unprotected by either scheme were unemployed persons,
notably housewives and children, whose injuries were not caused by motor
accidents. This wholesale exclusion meant that the common law had to be
retained for the class of non-workers, thus creating an awkward dual system
of accident compensation. 20
By amendment in 1973, before the law took effect in 1974, Parliament
added a Supplementary Scheme to cover non-workers' 2 ' and authorized separate funding of this scheme out of general revenues. 2 2 Financing seems to

111 Accident Compensation Amendment Act (No. 2), [1973] 1 N.Z. Stat. 829, No.

113.
112

113

ACA, s. 128.
Id., s. 137.

114 See the White Paper,supra note 13, para. 326.
115 ACA, s. 138.

110 Id., ss. 54-90.
117 Id., ss. 91-102.
1181d., s. 55(1); see also ss. 84-89.
119

Id., s. 92.

120

See Gair Report, supra note 48, para. 15.

121 ACA, ss. 102A-D.
122

Id., s. 102D(1) (a).
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have played a key part in the evolution of the A CA. The Earners' Scheme was
to be financed from levies on employers similar to those collected under the
existing Workers' Compensation Act.123 The Motor Vehicle Accident Scheme
also had a ready source of funds in the insurance premiums paid by car
owners d 24 private insurance against liability for personal injury was made
unnecessary, and comparable fees were imposed by the Act in place of insurance. However, there was no such fund waiting to be tapped to compensate
non-workers, and the great reluctance of Parliament to authorize payments
from general revenues must be seen as relevant to the legislative understanding
of the term "community responsibility."
The Gair Committee played the decisive role in eliminating non-workers
from the original scheme. (It should be kept in mind, however, that nonworkers injured in motor accidents were covered under that scheme.) The
Committee's statement on this matter is worth quoting in full:
The one field covered by the Royal Commission's scheme but not funded under
our proposals is that of other accidents to non-earners apart from vehicle accidents. We felt doubtful as to the practicality of covering this field. The costs of
compensation for the estimated number of accidents in this sphere are not particularly high. But we were influenced to some extent by the warnings of the
Manager of the State Insurance Office and of the representatives of the insurance
industry that costs would not be easy to control in this field. Medical witnesses
also pointed out the difficulties of drawing the line between accidental injuries
and sickness with elderly people. Thus, after considering the difficulty of raising
finances for this field, the doubts about the control of costs, and the demarcation
problems, we concluded that progress in this field should await the report of the
Royal Commission on Social Security but it should not eventually be left unre125
solved.

The Committee did not raise the question why non-workers as a group
should be asked to "sacrifice" their just benefits in order to protect the fiscal
health of the Act. Instead, their decision was justified by criteria fully ap-

propriate to the traditional design of a social security scheme in which policy
makers are free to be selective-no reference was made here to the "objective" losses recognized by common law that would not be compensated under
the ACA. The fact that the negligence action was temporarily left in existence
for the sake of these non-workers was little consolation, given the dubious
regard in which every investigative panel claimed that it held the common law
method of administration. The only way in which one can reconcile the Gair
Committee's simultaneous slighting of non-workers and its legalistically justified enlargement of benefits for the short-term injured worker is to take note
of trade union pressures on the Committee. Cost alone would have favoured
the Woodhouse Commission's policies of excluding major benefits for lost
earnings for injuries shorter than four weeks rather than cutting off housewives, children, and the elderly from ACA coverage.
Under the Supplementary Scheme passed in *1973, which came into force
with the other two schemes in 1974, all non-workers except the elderly receive
2

M Id., ss. 71 etseq.

124

Id., ss. 98 et seq.

125

Gair Report, supra note 48, para. 35.
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the same benefits as workers. Of course, they receive nothing in the way of lost
earnings, but they do receive compensation for medical expenses and noneconomic loss. The law did not return to the suggestion by the Woodhouse
Commission to provide non-workers with a minimum flat-rate weekly payment,-20 presumably because that would be too much in the spirit of social
security rather than "real compensation."
The special exclusion of payments to persons over 651-7 (unless the
accident occurred when the victim was over 60, in which case more specialized
rules apply) under any of the three compensation schemes may be attributable
to prospects for a new policy on superannuation in New Zealand. Both the
Labour Party and the National Party recommended comprehensive programmes in this area, and it was expected at the time that the ACA was passed
that major changes in this policy were forthcoming. The National Party plan,
which eventually became law,'12 8 provides a high level of benefits, so one
should not view the exclusion of the elderly from the A CA as a suspension of
"community responsibility."
A further grab-bag of exclusions from coverage under the A CA are apparently based on the moral or criminal culpability of the claimant. Although
these exclusions will apply to very few people, they raise interesting questions for the purpose of clarifying the Act's commitment to universal entitlement-especially since the financial savings from these exclusions are
from coverage anyone whose injuries were
negligible. The ACA disqualifies
"wilfully self-inflicted,"' 2 9 dependents of persons who have committed suicide
(although, in cases of "special need," the families may receive some survivors'
benefits) 130 and any person who has been convicted of murder or manslaughter of a covered decedent."'1
2
The background reports provide little illumination of these exclusions."
No doubt they seem intuitively plausible and uncontroversial as social policies, but conceptually they raise the issue of whether community responsibility to provide compensation can be avoided by flagrant acts of individuals.
In general, the ACA imagines its beneficiaries as the "statistically inevitable
victims" of complex social life. 33 The spirit of the statute differs fundamentally from tort doctrines in that it generalizes the issue of responsibility;
in place of duties owed between particular persons, the ACA finds a general
social duty to provide for the victims of accident regardless of the cause of
injury."14 If someone is injured by industrial machinery or a defective product-situations in which culpable defendants are frequently hard to catch
under modem negligence doctrines-society in general has the responsibility
120 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 300.
127 ACA, s.128.
128 Social Security Amendment Act, [1976] 1 N.Z.Stat. 432, No.40.

12 oACA, s.137(1) (a).
130 Id., s.137 (1)(b).
13 Id.,s.138.
132 See White Paper, supra note 13, paras. 322-26.
133 See Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 1.
134 See id., paras. 5 and 6.
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to compensate. If someone is the victim of violent crime, there is no difficulty
in placing immediate responsibility on the perpetrator; yet here too the ACA
requires that society shoulder exclusive responsibility for compensation
(while the criminal may also be punished for his offence against the social
order).
In other words, social responsibility to provide compensation is not
confined in the statute to a residual class of cases in which a defendant satisfactory to the common law cannot be found. The implication is that, even
where individual action appears to supersede the general causative force of
"society's" activities, the responsibility to compensate the victim still rests
with society.
Consider now the individual claimant who is injured not by the deliberate act of another, but by his own "wilful" act. 1:35 If we construe this word
narrowly (as the common law would) to avoid reintroducing a concept of
contributory negligence or "gross" contributory negligence, we are left with
the relatively small number of situations in which people intentionally execute their own injuries: for example, shooting off a "great toe" in order to
supplement one's income by ten percent under the new Act. Was this what
the drafters were concerned about? To a law-trained person like Mr. Justice
Woodhouse, this exclusion may have made sense as a type of anti-fraud
measure, a guarantee against inducing self-inflicted injuries with the creation
of the whole state compensation scheme. Yet the specific intent to defraud
is not mentioned in the statute.
Nevertheless, the general exclusion of benefits to the families of suicide
victims 1 36 goes well beyond any safety provision against fraud. There is no
way to reconcile this provision with the general theory of community responsibility, except to see it as a specific exception based on social custom. For
this and the exclusion of self-inflicted injuries, there is also the legal maxim
that "no one shall profit from his own wrong," an axiom that would satisfy
any backer of the ACA who saw the scheme as essentially a substitute for
private law rights. The maxim applies most clearly, perhaps, to the exclusion
of survivors' benefits to dependents who are convicted of murder or manslaughter of the decedent. 137 This exclusion is narrowly drawn, requiring "conviction" of the stated offences rather than some independent showing of
intentional killing. The dependent acquitted by procedural technicalities or
acquitted by reason of insanity is therefore able to claim benefits as a
survivor. 38
13 5 ACA, s. 137(1) (a).
136d., s. 137(1)(b). For a comparison of rights under this section with rights
under preceding law, see Coote, Suicide and the Claims of Dependants, [1976] N.Z.L.J.
54.
137 See the famous discussion of this maxim as it applied to homicides as life
insurance beneficiaries: Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven:
Yale U. Press, 1921) at 40-44.
138 In a recent review hearing, the Commission implicitly acknowledged the right
to file a claim of a husband who was acquitted, by reason of insanity, of murdering his
wife. The claim was denied on other grounds, however. ACC Review Hearings, 74/
R00267, February 26, 1975, reprinted in ACC Report (1976), infra note 172, at 17.
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The exclusions discussed so far reveal certain limits to the values of
universal eligibility and the corresponding community responsibility to provide "real compensation." The Gair Committee and the drafters of the original bill permitted the glaring exclusion of non-workers, on the grounds of
their concern for overall costs and an appropriate source of funding. Further
exclusions were allowed pending new policies of community responsibility
in other areas such as superannuation. Finally, ad hoc exclusions were recognized for claimants who stood to profit from their "own wrong," despite the
inconsistency with the very broad principle of social responsibility implicit
in the Act. We should note, however, that a similar group of claimants was
not excluded, namely persons injured during the course of committing a
crime.13 9 Such persons can recover under the Act for their injuries, even
though they may also be subject to penalties for their criminal actions. On
this point, the statute does remain consistent with the principle of community
responsibility.
The Exclusion of Compensation for Sickness and Congenital Defects
The provisions just reviewed represent exceptions to the principles of
universal entitlement to compensation for accidental injuries. With the addition of the Supplementary Scheme to bring non-workers into the plan, the
exceptions are not major in terms of persons affected, although they reveal
a willingness to compromise with universality for the sake of other goals.
Our perspective changes greatly, however, when we identify a different
form of selectivity in the fact that the Act as a whole singles out for "real
compensation" only those losses caused by personal injuries from accidents.
We saw earlier that the Woodhouse Commission was fully aware that the
"logic" of its basic principles could not support preferential treatment for
losses caused by accidents rather than by ordinary illness, congenital defects,
or other causes.'40 Likewise, the Gair Committee declared that it found the
principle of community responsibility most compelling "when used to sup41
port the uniform treatment of all disabled, the sick, as well as the injured.'
Yet it is not surprising, where major legislative innovation is concerned, that
a country chooses to move cautiously, starting with a single area like accident
compensation instead of moving directly to a comprehensive programme
covering all forms of disability. The institutions that have dealt in the past
with accident compensation are different for the most part from the public
institutions responsible for health services, and reform in the latter area is
likely to create distinct problems, which are entitled to separate treatment.
At the present time, New Zealand faces the decision whether to extend
its compensation programme beyond the field of accidents. 142 Moreover, in
2.

139 See White Paper, supra note 13, para. 326. For an interesting discussion of the
policy reasons for including convicted criminals within this scheme, see Palmer, Compensating Criminals, [1975] N.Z.L.J. 608. The proposed Australian scheme (see note
143, infra) specifically excludes compensation for persons injured in the course of committing specific serious crimes. See National Compensation Bill, 1975, s. 13, reprinted
in 1 Compensation and Rehabilitation in Australia, see note 143, infra.
140 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 17.
141 Gair Report, supra note 48, para. 8.
142 See supra note 45.
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1974, the architects of the original New Zealand scheme were invited by the
Whitlam Labour government in Australia to propose a compensation law for
that country that would encompass all disabilities, extending earnings-related
benefits to victims of disease and natural disability. 143 Both these proposals
raise enormous questions of cost and administration. Unlike the more limited
scheme in New Zealand, financing would come largely from general taxation,
and existing social security and health programmes would have to be overhauled. While the "logic" of the New Zealand scheme is compelling to many
legislators, the practical difficulties of extending the programme remain large
indeed.
Practical concerns aside, the question of "logic" requires deeper investigation. In examining the concept of real compensation, we saw that it was
possible to utilize the same categories of "objective" loss regardless of the
precise source of loss. Lost earnings can result just as easily and, probably
more often, from illness as from accident. The psychic costs of permanent
incapacity are no less for the victim of disease than for the victim of a motor
accident. Nothing in the recognized concepts of loss would prevent their use
as a standard for measuring compensation in a much wider scheme.
However, it does seem strange to speak of compensating the cancer
victim for pain and suffering or for loss of capacity to enjoy life, in part
because these common law concepts have never been applied by the judicial
process to victims of ordinary disease. Being ill does not create a cause of
action; against what defendant could the sick person complain? The common
law recognizes no losses from illness as such, because it cannot -assign the
responsibility within its essentially individualistic, interpersonal framework.
On the other hand, we saw how the ACA represents a radical change of the
traditional private law notion of responsibility, putting in its place community responsibility for accidental injuries and abolishing individual liability.
Does the "logic" of this concept of community responsibility carry over into
new fields of compensation where the common law has never ventured?
The ACA and its background reports hoped to find in the common law
a new justification for collective social action in the field of accident compensation. The rationale for collective action was based on an analogy with
common law theories of responsibility placing liability on individual persons
who cause injury to others. In the New Zealand scheme, the element of causation is essentially retained but the liability is assigned to society as a collective whole. To push the legal analogy only slightly, the A CA imposes vicarious
liability on the state for the torts of its citizens committed on each other.
It is no longer individuals who are recognized as the legal cause of accidental injury, but society, working through its individual members. 144 The
143 Their report was published in three volumes: Aust., Compensation and Rehabilitation in Australia (Canberra: Halstead Press, 1974). For background and a
summary of the Australian scheme, see Luntz, Compensation and Rehabilitation (Melbourne: Butterworths, 1975); and the subsequent Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs: Clauses of the National Compensation Bill

1974 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1975).
144

Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 89.
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concept that the injury is still caused by some agent, although a collective
agent, is depended upon very heavily.
The Woodhouse Report clearly assumes this novel theory that society is
the collective agent of losses through accident. The community's responsibility is based on the premise that accidents are caused by the collective participation of all its members in modem technological society. In its opening
section, the Commission declares that "the toll of personal injury is one of
the disastrous incidents of social progress, and the statistically inevitable
victims are entitled to receive a co-ordinated response from the nation as a
whole."' 14' Emphasis has been added to the statistical concept of causation
in this premise, which is a sudden removal from strict common law doctrine,
although still analogous to the more concrete legal understanding of cause.
The Commission acknowledged what commentators have long told us: 14
with technological progress comes an inevitable increase in accidents. The
victims of progress are not precisely identifiable, but their number must increase as more powerful instruments are produced and social interaction
grows more complex. While in many cases, such as motor accidents, we can
point to an individual who was "at fault," perhaps even grossly or wantonly
negligent, the total number of such accidents would not occur if the use of
the automobile were not so much a part of modem life. Even the drunk
driver-the perfect defendant in an ordinary tort suit, provided that he has
insurance-could not cause the same degree of damage if society did not
make available such powerful instruments of destruction. Society's responsibility is thus conceived on a level distinct from the responsibility of individuals in particular cases, though both levels may exist simultaneously. It
is, nonetheless, by analogy with the legal responsibility of individuals that this
related notion of community responsibility should be understood. "Society"
as a responsible agent cannot, obviously, possess a culpable state of mindor any state of mind, for that matter. However, even here the analogy holds
with legal responsibility in tort, which likewise requires no particular culpable
mental state of the defendant, despite the connotations of the language of
fault and the fiction of the ordinary prudent man. 147
Having developed a new theory of social responsibility, the Woodhouse
Commission made no rigorous examination of how far the logic of the theory
extended. For example, the Commission made no effort to explain why, on
this principle, society should be responsible to victims of "exposure to the
elements."' 4 8 Anyone struck by lightning would presumably qualify under
145 Id., paras. I and 56 [emphasis added].
146 As noted above, the Woodhouse Commission was greatly impressed by the

scheme proposed by Ison in the Forensic Lottery, supra note 20. See the Woodhouse
Report, supra note 10, para. 97.
147 Woodhouse Report, id., para. 87. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 108; and Harper
and James, 2 The Law of Torts, supra note 20, § 12.1.
148 Woodhouse Report, id., para. 289 [Contingencies to be Covered]: "(d) Incapacity ... should be protected when the injury resulted from an unexpected or undesigned
external cause, including exposure to the elements. . - ." This explains why the injury
qualifies as a compensable loss, but it does not connect the loss with the principle of
community responsibility.
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the ACA, even though it is hard to cast him as one of the statistically inevitable victims of social progress. One might also question the sense in
which society is responsible for injuries from criminal assaults. There are
theories to support such an idea, 149 but we cannot assume that a distinguished Supreme Court Justice of New Zealand necessarily embraced them.
The weakness of this concept of social responsibility is plain: "society"
is such a large abstraction that it becomes a platitude to say that it is "responsible" for everything that happens. Is this responsibility any different
when connected with a statistical increase in automobile accidents, with
injuries from medical malpractice, or with assaults by psychopathic killers?
Must "society" always act through some human agency? Apparently not, if
injury from "exposure to elements" qualifies for compensation.
It is in this context that the issue of compensation for illness should be
considered. If the community's responsibility to compensate is justified by the
causal impact of social progress, this logic may not, in fact, compel the state
to assume responsibility for organic disease or congenital defects. Many
diseases and birth defects can be linked to environmental causes or otherwise
associated with technological growth and the march of social progress. However, links of this sort remain to be proved in many instances, and in any
case the supervening effects of individual biology cannot be ignored. Any
programme of compensation for illness that attempted an empirical assessment of society's impact would involve itself in extreme complexity. However, to ignore the question of the limits of society's effects and to assume
that society fs responsible for every illness that occurs is to adopt a platitude.
The more nebulous this notion of society as causal force, the weaker the
argument for community responsibility will be to skeptics.
The Woodhouse Report contains a second argument in favour of its
concept of community responsibility, one modeled on contract theory rather
than torts. In a modem twist of the concept of a social contract, the
Commission argued that, if society is willing to benefit economically from
individual action, it should shoulder the costs which fall on innocent but
"statistically necessary" victims of accidents. 160 This argument is related to
the doctrine of quasi-contract, 151 and it also has some resemblance to the
tort principle of assumption of risk. However, neither doctrine advances beyond the more basic argument for responsibility based on causation. In the
absence of any precise legal analysis uncovering the limits of society's implied
contractual obligations or the limits of the risks that society has assumed,
both doctrines become vague, analytically useless appendages. Doubtless
each one makes intuitive sense when applied to particular classes of accidental injuries, but neither is sufficient to reach all of the injuries already covered
under the A CA.
149 For an historical treatment of these theories, see Kittrie, The Right to be
Different (London: John Hopkins Press, 1971).
10 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 56.
151 On the recent convergence of contract and tort doctrines, see generally Gilmore,
The Death of Contract, supra note 21.
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To summarize, it is not at all clear that the logic of the principle of
community responsibility applies to compensation for illness or congenital
defects. For that matter, the rationale for this principle contained in the
Woodhouse Report, modeled on common law concepts of responsibility, may
not even suffice to justify the state's duty to compensate all cases currently
covered under the existing ACA. The theory is nevertheless very compelling
for most accidents in modem society, provided that we accept the idea that
society's actions are linked statistically with rising accident rates. Whatever
reservations one might have about the use of a causal theory of responsibility,
it seems to be more compelling in the area of accident compensation than
in the areas of sickness and birth defects. It is no doubt fortunate for the
principle of community responsibility that it gains its foothold in the area of
torts, where jurists have been long accustomed to manipulate the concept
of cause. The principle would surely face more serious challenge as the basis
for a comprehensive programme of earnings-related sickness benefits.
The Outlook for Extending Compensation Beyond Personal Injury
In looking at the broad selectivity involved in limiting the ACA to
compensation for losses resulting from "personal injury by accident," we
have explored the conceptual pressures created by dropping the limitation
to "accidents." We should now look at the reasons for the limitation to losses
"from personal injury." There are other routes to economic and psychic loss
besides personal injury, and the common law of torts thrives on them. Most
important is property loss, 152 which can result from accidents as well as from
a variety of other causes such as breach of contract, deceit, and natural
disasters. Certainly the amount of property loss incurred by members of
society has grown enormously with technological progress; here too we find
victims of progress who are "statistically inevitable," even though complex
factors sometimes obscure the link between property loss and social progress.
Property losses in automobile accidents are just as easily attributed to technological change as are personal injury losses. Property losses, moreover, are
essentially economic and are probably easier for a commission to assess than
the kinds of non-economic loss associated with personal injury.
3.

The legislative reports on accident compensation in New Zealand are
surprisingly silent about property loss' 53-even property loss associated purely with "accidents" and long recognized under the common law as com152 Property loss in torts is treated as a major category of damages; it is as much
a compensable loss as lost earnings. See Street, supra note 13. The ACA, s. 121, specifically rules out compensation for "losses necessarily and directly resulting from the
injury or death" that are in the nature of property damage, expenses of estate administration, loss of opportunity to make a profit, or loss arising from inability to perform a
contract.
153 Property loss is discussed and included in the scheme proposed by Ison, supra
note 20, which the Commission cited with approval on other matters, but even Ison
hesitated to include property loss: "Finally, although the abolition of liability for
property damage has been suggested, it is in the nature of an optional extra. Reform of

personal injury compensation is obviously most vital, and the extended plan could be
adopted either with or without this suggestion extending to property damage." Op. cit.
at 100.
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pensable. There is not even a whisper that personal injuries constitute a more
urgent social problem than property loss. The impact on the victim whose car
is demolished in a road accident or whose house is destroyed by fire can be
serious, perhaps more serious than a temporary injury caused by the same
accident. In short, nothing in the logic of real compensation, community
responsibility, or the social welfare needs of individuals appears to exclude
property loss from the scheme. One would expect its inclusion, absent special
reasons for omission. Why then is the matter passed over in the ACA?
No doubt one reason is the magnitude of the undertaking. One scarcely
knows where to begin in assigning a value to property loss suffered by an
entire society. However, if such losses are limited only to those caused by
"accidents," the problems are no greater than those that the Woodhouse
Commission faced in estimating the costs of personal injuries.
A more likely reason why property loss escaped the attention of the
Commission is that a wider group of claimants would have had to be considered. 5 4 Only individuals can be injured physically, but associations of
many kinds, including corporations, suffer property loss. There would have
been little basis for compensating the individual whose home is lost in a fire
while ignoring the claim of the corporation whose factory is destroyed. To
be sure, many kinds of social policy apply to both individuals and associations, and private law treats corporations as legal persons, but the creation
of a comprehensive social scheme from which businesses would stand to receive compensation raises large political questions. The fact that this option
was not exercised may shed some light on the welfare state underpinnings
of the A CA.
Still another reason for ignoring property loss in this kind of law is the
plausible claim that private insurance works more satisfactorily in this area
than with personal injuries,- 5 Those with property often have the extra resources and prudence to secure the property against accidental loss. Whether
this assumption is plausible in New Zealand was not established by the
Woodhouse Commission or by any later inquiry, and there is no evidence
that the Commission even posed the issue of compensation for property loss.
The ACA simply follows the conventional welfare-state policy of concentrating on the urgent needs of individuals. It leaves to traditional tort law and
private insurance the task of mitigating risks and damage to personal property.
Just as the scheme ignores compensation for property loss, it passes over
other recognized sources of loss, both economic and non-economic. These
include the traditional economic torts (unfair competition, business libel, and
the like) and the so-called "intentional torts" (libel and slander, assault,
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, and sundry
others). Personal physical injury may result from assault and battery, and
the New Zealand law would properly apply to such injuries. However, no
recognition is given to the individual's interest in his reputation, personal
154 Ison, id. at 97.
155 This argument is made by Atiyah, supra note 11, at 573.

1980]

Accident CompensationSchemes

privacy, or physical freedom of movement-interests protected in some common law jurisdictions. Frequently, courts award punitive damages in cases
involving intentional torts-damages over and above "actual" damages. Perhaps we would not expect a state-run compensation scheme to pay punitive
damages where the state's "responsibility" for the injury does not amount to
a form of intentional infliction of loss. Nevertheless, nothing would prevent
a compensation scheme from recognizing only "actual" losses'5 " to reputation
or privacy, and a statutory ceiling could be imposed even on these awards,
much as the ACA has done in recognizing pain and suffering associated with
physical injury.
We can conclude this discussion with the summary observation that both
conceptual and administrative complexities would be heaped upon any state
compensation programme that recognized loss to personal property, reputation, privacy, and freedom of movement. Furthermore, political repercussions
would doubtless result from such a programme where corporations and other
groups stood to receive large sums, or where a well-developed private insurance market (in the case of most types of property loss) already exists.
Finally, the financial cost of such a scheme would expand the size of the
economic undertaking well beyond the present level of the ACA. Resistance
to increased costs and to plans for financing these additional categories of
compensation would add to the political infeasibility of the entire programme.
In a practical sense, it comes as no surprise that the ACA limited its
coverage to losses following upon "personal injury" by accident. It does,
however, provide some perspective on the concepts of real compensation
and community responsibility, whose philosophical breadth and "logic" argue
against any exclusions, that they are here implemented in a selective manner.
While the Woodhouse Commission and later investigators-predominantly
jurists-noted the anomaly of restricting the scheme to accidents as opposed
to sickness, they apparently saw no issue in ignoring major areas of tort law
completely.
C. Costs and Financing of the A CA
The financial provisions of the A CA cast important light on certain difficulties noted elsewhere in this survey. Reasons for some of the exemptions
from coverage, in addition to the political and conceptual considerations
considered above, can be found in financial exigencies. The law as conceived
by the Woodhouse Commission and through its passage in 1972 had two
economic features of overriding importance: the costs of the scheme were
promised to be equal to or less than the amounts spent on accident com157
pensation under the existing mixture of public and private programmes,'
150 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that damage awards in defamation
suits beyond "actuar' damages are in conflict with interests protected by the First
Amendment. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 at 349-50, 94 S.Ct. 2997
at 3012 (1974). The Court declined to define "actual injury" except to point out that
it is "not limited to out-of-pocket loss." It remains to be seen whether trial courts are
able to implement this standard.
157 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 10.
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and the funds to finance the scheme were to come from essentially the same
sources, namely from employers who paid Workers' Compensation premiums
and from drivers who purchased automobile insurance.', 8 The sources of
funds adequate to finance a programme of accident compensation were already in existence, and the ACA promised to provide more comprehensive
coverage for society as a whole without disturbing to any major degree the
amounts or kinds of premiums. 159 Above all, there was no plan to finance
any part of the scheme out of general revenue-until 1973, with the belated
passage of the Supplementary Scheme to protect non-workers.'" 0
The law is divided into three distinct schemes, primarily, it would seem,
for accounting purposes. The Earners' Scheme is the outgrowth of Workers'
Compensation and is financed completely out of contributions by employers.'"'
Under the ACA, there is no requirement that an accident be work-related in
order for an earner to qualify for compensation, and benefits are scaled on
the more generous common law model rather than on the more penurious
Workers' Compensation formula.?' - The increased benefits, however, were
expected to come out of savings in administration under the publicly admin10 3
istered programme, not from increased premiums placed on employers.
These premiums are only slightly modified from the old Workers' Compensation schedules.'" 4 Levies are differentiated through a complex classification
of industries and employers, with a uniform percentage of wages charged
against all employers within each class. The ACA left room for the ACC to
penalize specific employers with bad accident records and to grant rebates
to those with good records.'"" However, according to Palmer, "it has so far
been impossible to use either of these provisions," apparently because adequate statistics on which to base penalties and rebates do not yet exist.'""
The Motor Vehicle Accident Scheme is much simpler. Levies are imposed on all automobile owners based on the rates established under private
insurance contracts, which were compulsory in New Zealand prior to the
Act. 167 A separate provision authorizing additional levies on drivers as opposed to owners has not as yet been implemented.'"" Here too the backers
of the Act hoped to cover the more generous benefits under the ACA by
reducing administrative costs below the levels of private insurance companies-not by increasing premiums.

158 Id., para. 312.
19 Id., paras. 9 and 433.

1 See text accompanying notes 121-26, supra.
16 ACA, ss. 31 and 71.
162 See Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 240.
103 Id., para. 434; White Paper, supra note 13, para. 177. The Woodhouse Report,
id., also expected to achieve savings by excluding compensation for short term injuries.
16 Palmer, supra note 89, at 38.
165 ACA, s. 73.
166 Palmer, supranote 89, at 39.
167 ACA, s. 98; see White Paper, supra note 13, para. 96.
168 Id., s. 100.
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However revolutionary the ACA might appear, these financial provisions of the original Act were scarcely designed to create shock waves in
financial terms. The law was sold as a more efficient way of dispensing approximately the same amount of money acquired from roughly the same
sources. In addition, the Woodhouse Commission noted that some pressure
would actually be taken off general revenues, since the more comprehensive
compensation of losses would reduce the number of needy cases requiring
aid under social security.'"9
As we saw above, resistance to coverage for non-workers injured in
non-motor accidents can be attributed to the desire not to upset this neat
continuation of the status quo in financing. 7 The Gair Committee expressed
concern that the costs in this area might grow out of control, and there was
no pre-existing scheme of premiums designed to cover precisely this class of
claims. Thus, the 1973 amendments creating the Supplementary Scheme for
non-workers crossed a large symbolic barrier in authorizing general revenues
to finance this particular scheme.' 7' As it turns out, premiums collected under
the other two schemes in the first years of operation have far outdistanced
claims, in part because it will take years for long-term claims to accumulate. 72 At the same time, anticipated expenses under the Supplementary
the ACC has had to
Scheme have been consistently underestimated, and
173
make supplementary requests to cover these costs.
What should be made of this acceptance of the financial status quo in
a law that otherwise appears so innovative? In relation to our entire discussion up to this point, we need to inquire how this method of financing
qualifies the principle of "community responsibility," because in reality, as
certain critics have pointed out, 74 it is not the community as a whole that
pays for all parts of the programme. In making this inquiry, we shall encounter various acknowledgments of theories popular in the United States
on the importance of allocating costs of accident compensation in accordance
with standards of economic "efficiency." Finally, we will speculate on the
relation of financial constraints to the more serious exemptions to coverage
under the Act, both with respect to the categories of loss recognized and to
the possibility of extending coverage to losses beyond those caused by
accidents.
The Woodhouse Commission anticipated the challenge that community
responsibility for accidents should lead to financing the entire scheme out of
general revenue.175 It met that argument as follows: It pointed out that in-

109 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, paras. 471-73.
170 See text accompanying notes 121-26, 157-62 and note 160, supra.
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Shearer, Gov't Printer, 1975-76) for 1975 and 1976, s. 6 [hereinafter ACC Report].
172
173

Id.

174

See White Paper, supra note 13, para. 200.
Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, para. 461.

175

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

18, No. 2

dustries were already operating under a regime of Workers' Compensation
premiums that have been passed on to consumers. Based on the assumption
that costs of goods do not change to reflect reduced costs of production,
particularly in industries with high premiums to transfer the burden suddenly
to taxpayers would make them bear the costs twice.'-, This reasoning restricts itself to the economic short run, however, and includes no argument
for why long-run adjustments in industrial prices would not reflect at least
part of the reduction in premiums. As an empirical prediction of what would
happen to industrial prices, the argument is scarcely enlightening.
An even more problematic argument was added by the Woodhouse
Commission: "[T]o the extent that the amount of these premiums has been
passed on by industry their cost is already being shared by the community,
even though indirectly. Accordingly, the broad principle of community responsibility is in this way being satisfied already. ' 177 The community that
elsewhere is said to have collective responsibility for all accidents-the
community of persons passing through unprecedented periods of technological and social progress-has momentarily become the community of the free
market. They are not, however, the same notions. The community of pricetakers in the free market must accept prices that are influenced by premiums
differentiated by industry, some of which doubtless cover accidents beyond
those that happen in a particular firm. In the absence of assurance that premiums are perfectly coordinated with real accident costs in every case, some
industries are doubtless subsidizing others, and some consumers are paying
more than their free market share of accident costs. True, all consumers will
pay something toward accident costs no matter how imperfect the match
between premiums and accident records of particular firms. In this sense,
society in the aggregate will bear the costs of accidents. But the share paid
by each member will be determined by the vagaries of fixed premium schedules and other departures from pure market processes. The proportions paid
by each person, based on his preferences as a consumer, will not necessarily
express the extent of his proper responsibility for bearing these costs, which
ought to be communal in nature, in keeping with the sense of community
responsibility.
General revenues, were they to bear the costs of accident compensation,
would also assign differing burdens to individuals. In theory, at least, general
tax burdens are established according to a society's particular sense of equity,
its sense of a fair balance between the total tax burden and the individual's
capacity to contribute to the whole.' 7 8 There is no reason to assume that
these differentials are identical to the differing burdens on consumers to
whom accident costs are shifted under a market pricing mechanism. The
Woodhouse Commission's suggestion that community responsibility can be
effectively discharged through market mechanisms is thus difficult to take
seriously.
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The Woodhouse Commission in fact placed little trust in the market as
a means for apportioning equitably the costs of accident compensation. This
is evident from its bold suggestion that premiums imposed on individual
industries and firms should be set at a flat one percent of wages and should
take no account of different accident rates either among classes of industries
or among firms within each class. 179 Declaring that "all industrial activity is
interdependent," 180 the Commission in effect repudiated the market as an
equitable means of apportioning costs to consumers. Instead, funds were to
be drawn from industrial and commercial activity as a whole, and consumers
would bear these costs in proportion to their level of consumption. This is
at least a gesture in the direction of communal responsibility, based on the
premise that contributions to the scheme should be proportional to each
person's level of expenditure.
This suggestion met criticism on various grounds. In the first place,
employers who had evidently not accepted the full communal implications
of the Commission's concept of "community responsibility" felt that some
8
industries were being asked to subsidize the accidents "caused" by others.1 ,
Within particular industries, firms with relatively good accident rates were
asked to subsidize their more careless competitors. The belief that accidents
are caused exclusively by individual agents, and that the corresponding duty
to compensate was tied to individual culpabality, still had strong adherents.
Not incidentally, these beliefs coincided with the self-interests of employers
in low-risk industries, thus guaranteeing that exponents of the individualistic
view would come forth. The employers who stood to have their premiums
raised drastically in proportion to other employers were not persuaded by
the rhetoric of communal responsibility to the extent that it reduced their
competitive advantage. We should look on this not so much as a conflict of
values, but rather as a conflict between the concept of the "community" and
the viewpoint of particular interests. Such a conflict arises in any legislation
which imposes community values on the private sector, whose members still
see their actions solely on the level of individuals.
The Woodhouse Commission thus bowed to political pressures to keep
the costs of the scheme roughly within the limits of existing sources for
earlier compensation programmes. It made no plausible case for its suggestion that the costs were equitably shared by the community as a whole by
virtue of being imposed on employers and owners of automobiles. However,
it did remain consistent with its communal values by refusing to define causal
responsibility on the level of individual industries, firms, or drivers through
the mechanism of differential levies. The argument that some particular industries, firms, or drivers caused more accidents than others was not enough,
in the Commission's view, to justify a proportional division of the duty to
compensate. Given this position, the only imaginable reason for sticking with
levies on employers and owners, rather than turning to general revenues, is
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the political simplicity of tapping pre-existing sources. As we saw above, one
of the difficulties in extending the New Zealand program to cover losses from
sickness is that the necessary funds are not being collected through any
existing mechanism. Dependence on general revenue would be certain to
raise conflicts between the collectivist values of a broader scheme and the
still prominent forces of particular interests.
The debate that followed the Woodhouse Report could not long ignore
the developing American academic discussion of accident costs, 182 a discussion that offered some support to all sides of the New Zealand debate.
The American theory, steeped in a market-oriented economic philosophy,
emphasized the standard of economic "efficiency" as the leading principle for
apportioning the costs of compensating accident victims. The spirit of this
theory is to dismiss as abstract and mysterious any effort to distribute costs
according to a principle of social justice. Justice is understood rather as the
outcome of market forces, operating either unrestricted or modified by social
fiat. 8 3 In the absence of a well-articulated and popularly accepted principle
of social justice, the ideal of cost efficiency has undeniable appeal. It is therefore no surprise that some proponents of the ACA turned to the American
theory to help rationalize the move toward
a new kind of welfare philosophy
184
whose premises were still very uncertain.
The American theory, although there are several important variants,
asserts generally that the standard of economic "efficiency" should be the
guiding principle for apportioning the costs of compensating accident victims.
According to the most elaborate presentation of this theory, 185 there are at
least three separate goals wrapped up in the criterion of efficiency: reducing
the administrative costs of providing compensation, selecting liability rules
that maximize the incentive to prevent accidents from occurring, and allowing the market to select an "optimum" rate of accidents by treating costs as
internalized by particular accident-producing activities. This last point is the
182 Preceding Calabresi's book in 1970, supra note 7, the journals already carried
the major themes of his approach. See, e.g., The Decision for Accidents: Al Approach
to Non-fault Allocation of Costs (1965), 78 Harv. L. Rev. 713; Fault, Accidents and
the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven (1965), 75 Yale L.J. 216; and Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the law of Torts (1961), 70 Yale L.J. 499. Critical
responses provoked a lively debate. See, e.g., Blum and Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of
Dr. Calabresi (1967), 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 239.
183 Calabresi admits that non-market concepts of justice set a framework within
which market determinations are permitted to operate, but he treats such concepts of
justice as unanalyzable ends of social policy. Supra note 7, at 24-26.
184 The economic perspective was first introduced into the New Zealand discussion
by Palmer, who was largely responsible for producing the 1969 White Paper, supra
note 13, para. 205. Palmer had just returned from the University of Chicago Law
School, where he had been immersed in the economic approach. In recent years he has
grown skeptical about the practical relevance of these theories to public policy. See
Palmer, supra note 89, at 38 and 40. Palmer has continued this description of his role
and of his changing attitude in a telephone conversation of December 5, 1977.
185 In addition to the arguments presented in the White Paper, supra note 13, the
Gair Report, supra note 48, para. 21, echoed the concerns about the effects on the
accident rate of removing levies from employers.
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overriding principle; it states that society should learn to live with the number of accidents that it is able and willing to afford, assuming that everything
else is done to make the costs of avoiding accidents as low as possible.
While this theory of cost efficiency played little part in the drive for
accident law reform in New Zealand, it did play a minor part in shaping the
final legislation. 86 Primarily it provided sophisticated arguments for shoring
up controversial features of the law, and all sides of the debate were able to
find something in it to help their argument. The Woodhouse Commission
took a very simple view of efficiency-the reduction of administrative costs
by substituting a state commission for the prevailing system of courts, lawyers, and private insurance. 187 At no point in the development of the A CA
was it seriously doubted that this goal could be achieved.
The Commission invoked an additional notion of efficiency in defence of
its plan to impose the costs of the scheme on employers and drivers, rather
than using general revenues. As discussed above, the Commission here departed from its value of community responsibility, most probably in response
to political pressure to finance the program out of existing resources. The
Commission justified this proposal with the suggestion that diffusing costs
free market was an equitable means of spreading the burden to
through the
"society."' 88 If the costs of compensation are placed directly on those activities that generate the majority of accidents-industrial production and automobile driving-social and technological progress will begin to "pay for
itself." Innocent accident victims will no longer subsidize economic growth;
their burden will be shifted to all those who enjoy the fruits of accidentproducing activities.
However, this was only a half-hearted embrace of the economic approach,
and it opened the way for opponents of the Commission to argue for important changes in the Commission's recommendations. 8 9 In the first place,
internalizing accident costs would arguably require differentiating among
categories of industries and among individual firms within each category. It
follows that the Commission's plan to tax all employers at the same rate
would have required low-risk industries and firms to subsidize their higherrisk competitors. The Commission's basic collectivist thinking--"all industrial activity is inter-related"-was lost in the return to the particularistic
premise that specific activities cause specific accidents. The logic of this economic ideal of internalizing accident costs leads farther than anyone in New
Zealand wished to go. Although the statute authorizes the ACC to make
particular adjustments in levies according to specific accident records in
individual industries and firms, the ACC has not yet used this power. 190 One
reason given is that the necessary statistics are not yet available. However, if
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there is any sense in the Woodhouse Commission's notion that industrial
activity is interrelated, there are conceptual barriers to the development of
satisfactory statistical records. At present, the ACC has simply retained the
industrial classifications of the old Workers' Compensation Scheme as the
basis for differentiating levies under the Act. The argument for greater internalization of accident costs has not led beyond the status quo.
The standard of pure economic efficiency threatens still deeper premises
of the ACA. The rigorous internalization of costs revises the whole individualistic framework of social causation and represents the precondition for
efficient allocation of resources. 1 1 To the extent that accident-producing
activities are not pinpointed to the level of individual action, whether for lack
of data or for political or bureaucratic reasons, the programme as a whole
cannot establish itself as efficient. From here it is a small step to questioning
the basic justice of the ACA: if it is not efficient in the economic sense, then
it must be redistributing resources, shifting the burden of accidents to those
who have not caused them. We have already seen that this line of reasoning
appealed to industries that stood to lose under the collectivist assumptions
of the Woodhouse scheme of levies.
The same argument also proved useful in changing more basic features
of the Woodhouse plan. Coverage for non-workers was easier to oppose on
the argument that certain accident-producing activities would be "subsidized"
out of levies on industry and automobile drivers. 192 The costs of covering
non-workers was small, even though hard to predict, as the Gair Committee
said in excluding them. 193 The main worry about cost was not the amount
of disbursements, but the sources of income: who would "subsidize" nonworkers? A similar debate about cost will undoubtedly arise with every
attempt to extend the reach of compensation beyond losses caused by accidents-for example, to losses from illness. 94 Not only will these costs be
high, but it will be necessary to tap new sources of financing. This will, in
turn, encounter not only political opposition, but also the complaints of
individuals on whom the tax burden falls most heavily that they are "subsidizing" certain costs which are not the results of their particular activities.
The goal of compensation will be regarded as conflicting with economic
efficiency, requiring some uneasy forms of compromise.

'9' Calabresi, supra note 7, at 6n. 8, admits the difficulty of setting precise limits
to the concept of "cause":
I am using 'cause' here and throughout this book as a 'weasel' word. I do not
propose to consider the question of what, if anything, we mean when we say that
specific activities 'causes' in some metaphysical sense, a given accident; in fact,
when we identify an act or activity as a 'cause', we may be expressing any of a
number of ideas. The concept of cause has long been subject to artificial uses,
in the name of policy goals.

192 Gair Report, supra note 48, para. 34.
193 Id., para. 35.
194 A concern about costs is evident in an Australian Senate Report on the
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legislation that would extend a New Zealand-type scheme to include loss from illness
and congenital disease. See note 143, supra, at 43.
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An identical conflict already occurs under the ACA with regard to certain types of accidents. It is surprising, for instance, that employers did not
raise stronger opposition to the inclusion of non-work-related accidents to
workers under the Earner's Scheme, which is fully funded by employers. 195
Apparently many employers did not immediately understand that they would
bear the burden of compensating employees who injured themselves by slipping in the bathtub at home or by breaking a leg on the ski slope. (This
responsibility extends to 100 percent compensation for the first five days of
lost earnings and comes directly from the individual employer.)19 There is
evidence that employers in growing numbers feel that they are subsidizing
activities that are causally unrelated to their operations. 197 By internalizing
costs unrelated to their actual production, economically marginal businesses
may consequently be placed in jeopardy. Such businesses are likely to argue
for a greater emphasis on economic efficiency at the expense of providing
comprehensive coverage.
It should be remembered that this concept of economic efficiency did
not in the least impress the Woodhouse Commission. 19 s Their report rests
on premises that are deeply antagonistic to this whole method of analysis.
Community responsibility in the sense understood by the Commission does
not refer to the particular causal influences proximate to specific accidents;
it is a collective responsibility shared by everyone who participates in modern
society and cannot be apportioned on the basis of individual patterns of consumption. On this view, no adequate criteria exist even in theory for internalizing the costs of accidents in such a way as to promote microeconomic
efficiency. Thus we found the Woodhouse Commission endorsing a flat one
percent levy on the wages paid by all employers; 199 in their view, when it
comes to assigning responsibility for accidents caused by modem technology,
all industrial activity is "interdependent." Despite this, in an effort to avoid
the political costs of finding new methods of financing accident compensation, the Commission helped itself to the efficiency argument in order to
rationalize its plan to tax employers to pay for accidents to workers and to
tax drivers to pay for automobile accidents. 200 This, however, opened the
door to a line of reasoning that encouraged the individual firm or driver to
ask why he should pay for the accidents of others more careless than he.
Ironically, the position of the ACA comes closest to the economicinspired theory of general deterrence on its broad, macroeconomic level.
195 See note 161, supra.
'D6ACA, s. 112. Due to last minute complaints by employers, the ACA limited
employers' liability for the first week compensation to work related accidents only. See
Palmer, supra note 89, at 36.
197 ACC Report, supra note 172, at 8. According to the 1975 annual Report of the
Accident Compensation Commission, op. cit. at 4, the Commission is re-examining the
whole issue of first week compensation and will consider recommending changes.
198 Woodhouse Report, supra note 10, paras. 328-36. Palmer agrees with their
assessment of the attitude of the Woodhouse Commission. Conversation of December
5, 1977.
199 Woodhouse Report, id., paras. 467-68.
20
0 Id., para. 464.
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General deterrence sees internalization of costs as the condition for allowing
society, on a macroeconomic level, to determine the optimum rate of accidents across society at large. The goal is neither to eliminate all accidents
nor to immunize certain actors from bearing the direct burden of proximately
related accident costs. Instead, it is the market which dictates how many
accidents it is willing to pay for through the costs of production passed on to
consumers. 201 The ACA does not share this degree of faith in broad social
policy decisions made spontaneously by the free market, but it does suggest
that, up to now, the price of technological progress has not been paid by the
majority of those who benefit from it. As a result of the fault principle and
the cumbersome processes of civil litigation (common targets of the theorists
of general deterrence), most accident costs fall on "the statistically inevitable
victims" of social progress. "°2 By shifting this burden directly onto the activities of industry and automobile driving, the A CA will have the effect of
making those activities more expensive and may consequently retard their
growth.
This result will appeal to anyone who feels that the pace of growth
should be slowed, by whatever means. However, it will not satisfy those
economic philosophers who take just as seriously the goal of microeconomic
efficiency. Higher premiums on employers and drivers will force marginal
actors out of the picture, but the ACA gives us no guarantee that the individuals so eliminated were those most responsible for accidents. A small
accounting firm with a low margin of profit as well as a low accident rate
may suffer more under the employers' tax than a high-risk growth industry.
Similarly, the low-income driver with a safe driving record will be deterred
from driving sooner than the high-income driver with a horrible record.
These are microeconomic effects which the backers of the ACA cannot
entirely ignore. Social progress has its costs; but so does deterrence, and both
may fall unfairly on individuals. We may agree with the advocates of the
ACA who have rejected the market mechanism for apportioning and optimizing these costs, but we may also note weaknesses in the financing method
of the current ACA. The statute presents no coherent theory of what a just
apportionment of costs should be. Such a theory would undoubtedly call
into question the basic fairness of general tax policies and would lead to a
much deeper examination of New Zealand's attachment to a new concept of
collective responsibility. The Woodhouse Commission's avoidance of this
issue made political sense, but any effort to expand the A CA into more ambitious areas of compensation will need to confront it.
Conclusion
This review of the financial provisions of the ACA helps explain some
of the compromises, exceptions, and inconsistencies that were noted in the
above critique of the A CA's substantive provisions. The unwillingness of
New Zealand to depart significantly from the financial status quo made it
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possible, on the one hand, for the ACA to appear generous in providing
benefits comparable to those granted under schemes whose financing structures were absorbed by the state. On the other hand, the ACA appears rather
conservative in failing to award such benefits for previously uncompensated
types of disabilities (such as illness and congenital incapacity). Future
studies of the ACA should be sure to compare substantive changes in the
statute with changes in New Zealand's fiscal and public finance policies.
More important, the problem of financing major new categories of social
benefits also needs to be seen as qualifying the main values underlying the
ACA. In particular, the concept of community responsibility, as described
above, enabled New Zealand to justify extending benefits to a greatly enlarged number of accident victims. For this purpose it was enough to leave
that concept in abstract form; the "community" is the agent that pervades
the actions of individuals and that makes their activities irreducibly interdependent. However, no such concept can conjure up the funds from its own
collective bank account. The money must come from individuals (including
businesses and other associations), and this re-particularizes the concept of
community responsibility in an important way. In future extensions of the
ACA, the concept of collective responsibility should be elaborated to include
a more coherent account of how that responsibility should be apportioned
among individuals. Until then, the ACA will retain potentially serious conflicts between collectivist rhetoric and the individual interests of those whose
burdens are increased.

